

Risk Management of Extreme River Floods

Management Aspects

- a during the Event Perspective of the Mulde Flood 2002 -

Introduction:


This poster was created within the second FLOOD^{master}-workshop called "River Floods" at the TU Dresden in January 2006 and presents an overview about the risk management part. It shows especially the during-the-flood perspective of the river flood 2002 in Eilenburg, Saxony and gives an outlook on the second poster of the risk management group, which deals with the post/pre-perspective.

Phases of disaster



General


Warning:



- missing communication
- information late and inexactly
- 3:30 a.m. disaster alarm declared
- warning by speakers:
 - Inadequately quality
 - population dismiss alarm
 - telephone information of the city hall massively overloaded
- no use of sirens



- characterized by four stages of warning (depends on the water level)
- depends on precipitation forecast
- mediums of warning e.g.: sirens, warning by speakers, flyers...



Evacuation:




- from 6 a.m. to 10 a.m. on August 13th
- half of the population of Eilenburg was evacuated
- well organized and scheduled
- the evacuation of the municipality was unsystematic
- city and "Einsatzstab" were separated by coincidence
- staff of the city hall found shelter in elementary school
- they didn't know a lot about (e.g. financial) regulations, so they didn't hesitate to help
- no plans at all for evacuating the city hall → needs consideration in future risk strategies (poster 2)

- important for an evacuation are:



- evacuation plans
- cooperation
- transportation
- supply of water, food, electricity and shelter
- communication

„Chaos“:




- chaos phase from 13th to 14th of August
- **big problem: missing means of communication** (e.g. only 3 cell phones within the "Einsatzstab" available)
- prevents a good communication between the two crisis areas and to the affected people
- administrative district Delitzsch was unable to manage the situation although it has the highest responsibility after the disaster alarm (3:30 a.m.)
- municipality, which is not prepared for such situations, has to lead all necessary steps

- Important for prevention of "chaos":
 - availability of essential infrastructure (water, power, means of communication) and goods (food, medicine)



- clear defined responsibilities
- fast decisions
- facing physical and psychological problems

Re-establishment:



- missing operation plan
- responsibilities unclear, no information network
- missing cooperation between local council/ regional administration
- no common ground of financial responsibilities
- problems with human aid

- organisation of administrative units
- planning and information service by one headquarter
- prepared operation system including:
 - clearly determined responsibilities
 - food and medical supply
 - donation and helping forces management
 - psychological help for citizens and helpers



The analysis shows that Eilenburg wasn't prepared for such an extraordinary flood event at all. Some incidents were helpful and lucky, like the spontaneously changed route the bus driver took, others made the situation even worse, e.g. that generally there are no useful means of alarm or communication and explicit authorities are missing. There is really an urgent necessity to develop a risk management strategy for Eilenburg. This will be presented on the second poster of the group 'risk management' which deals with the post/pre-perspective of the flood in 2002.

