

Incentive-based Subsidy and Tax for Efficient Generation Investment

L. Varawala¹, M. R. Hesamzadeh¹, G. Dán¹, I. Vogelsang², J. Rosellon³,⁴

¹KTH Royal Institute of Technology
 ²Boston University
 ³Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
 ⁴DIW Berlin

Dresden, April 11, 2019

Introduction

System operator: Social welfare maximiser

 $\max_{\mathsf{Price}}(\mathsf{Consumer\ surplus} + \mathsf{Producer\ surplus})$

+ Merchandising surplus - Externalities).

Producer i: Profit maximiser

max Producer surplus_i(Price, Output_i).

Small number of producers - market power

No consideration for externalities such as pollution

There is a mismatch in desired outcomes. Regulation can address ${\rm this}^1.$



¹Loeb, M. & Magat W. A., 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," J Law and Econ. 1/16



- Organisation
- Producers, consumers and merchant
- Need for regulation and problems with price caps
- Proposed regulatory scheme
- Conclusion Properties of the scheme

Organisation



- Regulatory phases (denoted by τ) investment
- Spot market production and consumption
- Producers Generators, Oligopoly (denoted by i)
 - Investment in generation capacity in regulatory phases
 - Generation in the spot market
- Consumers Loads, Continuum
 - Consumption in the spot market
- Merchant Transmission System Operator, Monopoly
 - ▶ Investment in transmission capacity in regulatory phases
 - Follows generator's investment decision
 - Transmission capacity connects buses (denoted by j)

Producers - Investment and Pollution



- ▶ Investment in generation capacity made during τ , $k_{\square} \ge 0$
- Generation capacity at τ , max[m] k m]
- Production in spot market limited by capacity investment in regulatory phases - dependence on production can be transferred to capacity
- Pollution attributed to generation²
- Pollution depends upon choice of technology
- Pollution abatement, emp
- Pollution production, x = x (k, e, e) non-decreasing in k, non-increasing in e
- Externality associated with pollution, $E_{\text{TF}} := E_{\text{TF}}(x_{\text{TF}})$

 $^{^2 \}rm Kim,~J.~C.~\&~Chang,~K.~B.,~1993.~"An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets," J Regul Econ. <math display="inline">$4/16$$

Producers - Cost and Revenue




- E0 01
- Cost of generation, C_{II} := C_{II} P_{III} P_{III}
 Total cost of generation, P_{IIII} C_{II} non-decreasing
- Cost of investment, C^G_{II} := C^G_{II}(k_{II}; e_{II}) increasing
 Total cost, P IIIIIIC_{II} + C^G_{II} convex
- Revenue, R^G_{III} := R^G_{III}
 Total revenue, P
 Total revenue, R^G_{III} non-decreasing

Consumers & Merchant



- ▶ Utility, $U_{\mathbb{T}} := U_{\mathbb{T}}$ $U_{\mathbb{T}} := U_{\mathbb{T}}$ concave





Need for Regulation



System operator:

$$\max \begin{array}{c} \mathsf{X} & \overleftarrow{\mathbb{S}} \\ \mathsf{max} & U_{\mathbb{Z}} - C_{\mathbb{Z}} - C_{\mathbb{Z}}^{\mathsf{G}} - C_{\mathbb{Z}}^{\mathsf{T}} - E_{\mathbb{Z}}^{\mathsf{S}} \\ \end{array}$$
(1)


Generator *i*:

 $\max \begin{array}{c} X & \textcircled{\mathbb{S}} \\ \max & R_{\fbox}^{\mathsf{G}} - C_{\fbox} - C_{\fbox}^{\mathsf{G}} \\ \end{array}$ (2)

- Market power generators suppress output to increase prices and hence, revenue
- ► No consideration for pollution






































Proposed Regulatory Scheme




Regulator provides generators with



where $F_{\mathbb{F}}$ is a fixed fee³.

³Hesamzadeh, M.R. & Rosellón, J. & Gabriel, S.A. & Vogelsang, I., 2018. "A simple regulatory incentive mechanism applied to electricity transmission pricing and investment," Energy Econ, Elsevier.







Properties of the Scheme



- ► The scheme is non-discriminatory.
- The regulator does not require information about the generators' cost functions.
- The subsidy of a generator decreases with increase in other generators' capacities.
- ► A Cournot equilibrium exists.
- The subsidy received is positive when there is a gain in social optimum, making participation voluntary.
- The regulator has to fund this scheme. However, the increase in consumer surplus and merchandising surplus due to the scheme is less than the subsidy.
- The subsidy encourages collusion.

Conclusion & Future Work



- ► The scheme encourages generators to maximise social welfare.
- ► It is within the market framework.
- It incentivizes capacity investments.
- It eliminates market power.
- It encourages pollution abatement.
- Auxiliary schemes are required to solve the funding problem and address collusion.



Incentive-based Subsidy and Tax for Efficient Generation Investment

L. Varawala¹, M. R. Hesamzadeh¹, G. Dán¹, I. Vogelsang², J. Rosellon³,⁴

¹KTH Royal Institute of Technology
 ²Boston University
 ³Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
 ⁴DIW Berlin

Dresden, April 11, 2019