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# A model-based market power analysis of the German market for Frequency Containment Reserve

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Samir Jeddi, 28th April 2018



1. Challenges for the German balancing power market

2. Methodology

- Bi-level market models
- Solution approach


3. Results

- Historic market power analysis
- Alternative market design
- Future market behaviour

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# Challenges for the German balancing power market

Market development favours market power



	FCR	aFRR	mFRR
<b>Cost [Mio. EUR]</b>	103	228	106
<b>Prequalified Suppliers</b>	23	34	46

Source: Own Illustration based on BNetzA (2016), Dena (2014) und regelleistung.net (2017).

# Challenges for the German balancing power market

Just a few model-based market power analysis in the literature



## Econometric and theoretical analysis:

- Impact of the formation of the GCC

Riedel und Weigt (2007), Müller und Rammerstorfer (2008)

- Correlation analysis between spot and balancing power markets

Growitsch und Weber (2008), Haucap et al. (2012)

- Analysis of bidding behavior

Heim und Götz (2013), Müsgens et al. (2014)

- Theoretical analysis of the pricing scheme

Belica et al. (2016)

## Market power indices:

Concentration ratio	CR <sub>1</sub>	CR <sub>3</sub>	CR <sub>4</sub>	CR <sub>5</sub>	HHI
Value	0.37	0.84	0.95	0.98	2,674
Critical value	(0.33)	(0.5)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(2,500)

Source: Own illustration based on Heim und Götz (2013).

## Model-based market power analysis:

- Models based on decision theory  
Ocker et al. (2015)
- Market models  
Wieschhaus und Weigt (2008)
- Structural analysis of modelled market results  
Knaut et al. (2017)

# Methodology

Bi-level market models simulate real market behaviour

## Optimization models: MPEC

Optimization problem  
Firm  $j$

$$\max_{p_i, DV} \pi_j = \sum_{i \in \Omega_j} (\lambda - c_i) * g_i$$

s. t.

$ULR_j$

$$\min_{g_i} C_{SO} = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i * g_i$$

s. t.

$$\sum_{i=1}^n g_i - D = 0 : \lambda$$

Market clearing of the  
TSO

## Equilibrium models: EPEC

Optimization problem  
Firm  $1$

$$\max_{p_i, DV} \pi_1 = \sum_{i \in \Omega_1} (\lambda - c_i) * g_i$$

s. t.

$ULR_1$

Optimization problem  
Firm  $j$

$$\max_{p_i, DV} \pi_j = \sum_{i \in \Omega_j} (\lambda - c_i) * g_i$$

s. t.

$ULR_j$

Optimization problem  
Firm  $M$

$$\max_{p_i, DV} \pi_M = \sum_{i \in \Omega_M} (\lambda - c_i) * g_i$$

s. t.

$ULR_M$

$$\min_{g_i} C_{SO} = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i * g_i$$

s. t.

$$\sum_{i=1}^n g_i - D = 0 : \lambda$$

Market clearing of the TSO

Source: Own illustration based on Ventosa et al. (2005).

# Methodology

Linearization is the preferred solution approach

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## Linearization:

- + Analytical
- + Identification of all equilibriums
- ~ Guarantee for optimality
- ~ Extensive analysis possible
- ~ Inclusion of a high number of variables

## Diagonalization:


- ⚡ Heuristic
- ⚡ Convergence problems
- ⚡ No guarantee for optimality
- ⚡ No identification of all equilibriums

## NLP-Formulation:

- + Differentiation of dual variables
- ⚡ High number of variables
- ⚡ Limited scope of analysis

# Results

Individual suppliers can just moderately influence the market price




	EPEC	Competition	MPEC			
			EON	ENB	RWE	VAT
Average price [EUR/MW]	2,427	2,302	2,379	2,397	2,408	2,406
Average yearly Lerner index [%]	6.50	0.00	4.28	5.14	5.63	5.51

# Results

Shorter contract durations increase the market power potential


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# Results

## Shorter contract durations might lead to welfare losses



# Results

## Battery storages improve the market efficiency in 2025

### Scenario A (NEP 2015)

- Low market penetration of RES
- Constant demand
- Biggest share of conventional generation

### Scenario C (NEP 2015)

- High market penetration of RES
- Demand reduction
- Lowest share of conventional generation

#### Low-Flex\_Therm

- 300 MW battery storage

#### High-Flex\_Therm


- 500 MW battery storage

#### Low-Flex\_EE

- 300 MW battery storage

#### High-Flex\_EE

- 500 MW battery storage



- ✓ **Equilibrium model** with **discrete** supply function
- ✓ Solution by innovative combination of **linearization techniques**
- ✓ Model **validation**
- ✓ Analysis of **alternative market design** and **future market behaviour**



- Historic market results: Limited market power
- Shorter contract durations: Lower system costs and increased market power
- Battery storage investments: Reduction of market power potential with decentralized ownership, as well as decreasing system costs
  
- Further research on modelling EPECs in real markets
- Modelling the optimization problem under consideration of stochastic opportunity costs

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**»Wissen schafft Brücken.«**