1. Demonstrative vs. Identity Theories of Quotation

Consider a familiar example of deferred ostention: pointing to a parked car just dented by a runaway driver, one says 'he is going to have a bad day', succeeding in referring thereby to the car’s owner. In deferred ostention, a demonstration picks out from the context an object or event; this is not the referent of the indexical to which the demonstration is associated, but an auxiliary with which to fix the referent, in virtue of some manifest relation between them (ownership, in the example). That the demonstrated item is not the referent of the indexical is usually clear in that it does not fit the indexical descriptive meaning: the car in the example is obviously not a male, as required by the use of ‘he’ for it to be the indexical’s referent. Nunberg (1993) argues that this is a more general phenomenon than we may think; the interpretation of ‘we’, for instance, according to him follows the mechanism of deferred ostention. Nunberg uses the term ‘index’ for the demonstrated auxiliary in deferred ostention. According to Nunberg, in uttering ‘we’ the speaker demonstrates himself as an index of this kind (no explicit act of demonstration being required, as when one says ‘that dog’ in the presence of a sufficiently salient dog), and the referent is obtained on the basis of some contextually signaled relation between the speaker and the group intended as referent. The deferring character of the demonstrated index is made clear in that the speaker does not fit the descriptive meaning of the plural indexical ‘we’.

In a previous publication (García-Carpintero 1994) I argued for (a version of) Davidson’s (1979) demonstrative theory of quotation (DT henceforth) that fits Nunberg’s generalization of deferred ostention; I also argued there against the Fregean identity theory (IT henceforth) as articulated and defended by Washington (1992). Consider a written utterance of the sentence (1)
(1) ‘Boston’ is disyllabic.

I will henceforth use ‘quoted material’ to refer to the material inside the quotation-marks (‘Boston’ in (1)), reserving ‘quotation’ for the whole constituted by it and the surrounding quotation-marks. I will think of quotation-marks as a single type taking different shapes: single apostrophes, double apostrophes and double angles are conventional graphic devices for quoting. I also take a device like italicization as a conventional form of quotation-marks.¹ For some purposes, it is less efficient than the resort to ordinary quotation-marks, given that italicization is not a recursive device; but it serves well in many cases.²

On the Fregean view, when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is a linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself.

On DT, in contrast, quotation-marks themselves are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. In the version I argued for, the quoted material works like Nunberg’s indexes. The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be:...instantiates the linguistic type ———, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the deferred ostention version of DT deals with a problem I pointed out for the identity proposal in my earlier paper, that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens (see the examples on p. 261 of García-Carpintero 1994). In characterizing the demonstrative content of quotation-marks, Davidson says that they “help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it” (Davidson 1979, 90); quotation “is a device used to refer to typographical or phonetic shapes by exhibiting samples, that is, inscriptions or utterances that have those shapes” (p. 79). The fact that with quotations we can refer to shapes not instantiated by the exhibited token, or to entities (tokens) which can hardly be counted as “shapes”, shows that these contentions need some emendation.³ To think of the role of the quoted material as an index (in Nunberg’s sense), related to the referent by some contextually signaled “natural” relation, is the obvious modification of Davidson’s original proposal that I suggested.
According to what I take to be the best theory of indexicals and demonstratives in general (see García-Carpintero, 1998), these are token-reflexive expressions; it is tokens of them that have reference, relative to conventional rules associated with the types they instantiate. On DT, thus, conventionally associated with quotation-marks there is a token-reflexive rule, which, by default, establishes that their tokens refer to the linguistic-type instantiated by the quoted material, acting as a Nunbergian index. That the quoted material is merely an index, and not the real referent of the token-quotation-marks, is on this view seen in that it lacks some of the descriptive features that the intended referent is conventionally required to have. The conventional token-reflexive rule for quotation-marks has it that, in the default case, their tokens refer to linguistic types; the quoted material is however merely a token.

One problem with DT, on which Washington based his defense of IT, is posed by those cases (particularly, although not only, in spoken language) where no form of quotation-marks is used. The theory appears to predict that those sentences, lacking an expression playing a syntactic role such as, say, the subject in a spoken version of ‘cat has three letters’, should sound syntactically defective in languages—like English—lacking the “pro-drop” feature. They are not perceived to be so, however; the presence of the quoted material seems to be enough for speakers to feel no syntactic solecism. In my previous work I retorted by offering pragmatic explanations of the intuitions indicated by Washington, and by raising what I took to be harder difficulties for IT; I concluded that, on balance, a theory slightly modifying Davidson’s proposal accounts for all known facts better than its rivals. Reimer (1996) and Saka (1998) have proposed new versions of IT. In so far as they incorporate important insights from DT—as I will show later—these proposals improve on the preceding versions. I remain unconvinced that IT offers a good account of quotation, however, for reasons I would like to expound here. I also want to show that DT can successfully deal with new difficulties raised by Saka, Gómez Torrente (2001) and Recanati (2001).

My own deferred ostension version of DT was inspired by a remark by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* § 16: “What about the colour samples that A shews to B: are they part of the language? Well, it is as you please. They do not belong among the words; yet when I say to someone: “Pronounce the word ‘the’”, you will count the second “the” as part of the sentence. Yet it has a role just like that of a colour-sample in language-game (8); that is, it is a sample of what the other is meant to say.” Wittgenstein is discussing here the role of samples like, for instance, the Paris standard meter (before another standard was adopted), or samples used to regulate applications of color-terms that require more precision than ordinary. Wittgenstein considers cases where an expression is mentioned while—unlike in (1)—quotation-marks are not used. (This is more likely to occur
when a sentence such as (1) is spoken, instead of being written down, the case his example obviously contemplates.) Let me refer to the case illustrated by (1) as ‘quotational mention’, and to the latter as ‘autonomous mention’; and let me extend the use of ‘quoted material’ to refer also to ‘Boston’ as it could occur in a case of the latter sort. In autonomous mention we intuitively perceive the quoted material as a linguistic expression. This is the fact pointed out by Washington against DT. In addition to noticing this, Wittgenstein claims that in autonomous mention (and, by implication, in quotational mention too) the quoted material functions semiotically as a sample. This is why, he argues, samples should also be counted as signs; for present purposes, a sign is something that plays a semiotic role (be it as a Peircean icon, as an index or as a symbol) in the determination of the content expressed in a given case.

As I understand it, what Wittgenstein puts concerning samples, to be settled by arbitrary decision, is the issue which sets DT and IT apart, in the case of quotation that he takes to be analogous: whether or not we should also count them as expressions, i.e., as linguistic signs. An expression will be here a sign belonging among the conventional expressive resources constitutive of a given language. Not every sign is an expression; we ordinarily express contents by means of icons or indexes that are not in addition symbols.

One may think that in the quoted text Wittgenstein is in fact subscribing to IT. But he only says that we naturally count the second ‘the’ as part of the sentence, not that it is part of the sentence. What he is saying is, I think: do as you please, count it as part of the sentence or not; but, consistently, you should do the same for samples, because samples and quoted materials play exactly parallel semantic roles. As I propose to characterize the debate, DT and IT disagree regarding the issue that Wittgenstein, with his characteristic quietist, anti-theoretical attitude, takes to be neither here nor there; namely, how to classify autonomous mention from a theoretical viewpoint. DT and IT disagree as to whether the quoted material that in autonomous mention we pre-reflectively feel to be a linguistic sign referring to itself should really be taken to be so, as opposed to being a merely non-linguistic sign (a Nunbergian index), in a comprehensive theoretical account of our linguistic practices.

Suppose that someone verbally utters (1), without marking ‘Boston’ with quotation-marks. Because quotation-marks according to DT are the only linguistic expression involved in quotation, the demonstrative theorist will claim that in such a case, no matter how we pre-reflectively feel about it, semantically speaking the speaker has just said something about whatever the proper name ‘Boston’ names in the context of utterance—something trivially false about a city in Massachusetts traversed by the Charles River, given acceptable assumptions about the presupposed context. By having recourse to Gricean mechanisms in familiar ways, however, we can easily derive a more
plausible (and truer) content, the one intended by the speaker. If taken literally, the utterance signifies a falsehood too obviously violating the first conversational maxim of quality. But we can easily find a different act of meaning in agreement with conversational maxims that the speaker, by counting on us to derive it in the way we are doing, could plausibly be assumed to be trying ultimately to convey. Given that the literal meaning of the predicate is such that the proper name of the city traversed by the Charles he has used falls in its extension, the most salient proposition anybody could expect to be obtained by these Gricean means attributes the property literally signified by the predicate to the linguistic type exhibited by the instance of the proper name ‘Boston’ that the speaker in fact uttered. This derivation shows that, according to DT, with respect to the act of meaning non-literally conveyed by the speaker, the token of ‘Boston’ that the speaker used is a sign used to indicate the type it instantiates. It is not a linguistic sign, an expression, however; because on that view it does not contribute to a conventionally expressed propositional content on the basis of conventional rules associated with repeatable features that the token instantiates.

IT, on the other hand, claims that no pragmatic story needs to be told to account for autonomous mention: the speaker’s words already convey, given their conventional meanings, the claim about the word ‘Boston’ obviously intended by the speaker. All expressions (and combinations of expressions) have conventionally a use (with or without quotation marks) such that tokens of them refer to the linguistic types they instantiate. For the identity theorist, ‘Boston’ is thus, in our example of autonomous meaning, a linguistic expression non-accidentally homonymous with the proper name of the city in Massachusetts, but differing in reference (and possibly in other aspects, like the specific subcategory of singular terms to which they belong). According to DT, the only linguistic expression in the example is the name of the city in Massachusetts; this notwithstanding, as I have emphasized, the token of ‘Boston’ acts also as a non-linguistic sign whose (speaker’s) referent is the type it instantiates. DT (at least the version I am defending) thus accounts, as much as IT does, for autonomous mention; it is just that, for the demonstrative theorist, it involves the use of ordinary linguistic expressions as non-linguistic signs referring to the types they instantiate.

Gricean accounts like the one suggested are familiar; they have been provided, for instance, to defend uniform Russellian accounts of definite descriptions in the face of so-called referential uses. Critics presuppose in some cases that the correctness of Gricean accounts requires that the derivations of the non-literal meanings from the literal meanings and conversational maxims reproduce inferences actually performed by speakers and their audiences either consciously or subpersonally. I think that the correctness of Gricean explanations requires neither such claim. They are rational reconstructions, intended to help make an ontological decision
about the source of the relevant cases of understanding: whether they
depend on specifically linguistic knowledge, or rather on knowledge of a
more general character. To properly serve this role, they must have some
psychological implications; but they are not the simple one envisaged by the
critics.\textsuperscript{10} Of course, in most cases of autonomous mention ordinary speakers
and their audiences do not have the conscious experience of interpreting the
sentence literally, and then deriving the allegedly non-literal meaning by
following the Gricean reasoning earlier suggested; and there are good
empirical reasons to reject the view that the actual derivation of implicatures
subpersonally proceeds by first determining the relevant literal meanings.
But I do not think that these concessions are harmful.

Two commitments that can be correctly attributed to the view I have
presented are as follows. Firstly, suppose that, according to the Gricean
theoretician, an utterance has a non-literal but much more easily con-
sciously accessible meaning—given the presence in most ordinary contexts
of contextually available pieces of world knowledge. Then, ordinary speak-
ers should at least be able to grasp the literal meaning, even if this requires
placing them in unusual contexts, by indicating that we are joking, etc.
Secondly, evidence coming from a variety of cases where the relevant
linguistic resources are conventionally used in a rational way should be
provided, to justify the theoretician’s claims about the specifically linguistic
knowledge he attributes to speakers using them. This commitment is
incurred in that the main justification for counting as non-literal a meaning
that speakers manage to convey easily, perhaps frequently and with no
conscious reasoning, lies in the simplicity of the thereby resulting theoretical
characterization of the language they speak. These two commitments can be
satisfactorily discharged in the present theoretical framework. It is trivial to
create a context in which any competent speaker would be sensitive to what
we have proposed to be the literal meaning of an autonomous spoken
utterance of (1). The second commitment will be discharged as we proceed.

Let us now go back to the main point I ascribed earlier to Wittgenstein’s
text. The point was that the quoted materials referring in both quotational
and autonomous mention to the types they instantiate (whether or not they
are “part of the language”) function as samples do; this is Wittgenstein’s
basis for his contention that samples are signs too. In terms of Nunberg’s
proposal mentioned at the outset, the point is that those signs are indexes.
Nunberg’s \textit{indexes} are signs, according to clear-cut considerations. Indexes
are signs because (relative, of course, to the conventional rules of the
language, and to those relations mutually known by conversational partici-
pants on which the speaker relies to determine the referent with the help
of the index) they have a contrastively essential role in the determination of
the speech act: the use of other indexes may result in a different speech act,
with a different content. In these terms, Wittgenstein’s point is that samples
like the standard meter are indexes, implicitly demonstrated whenever an
expression depending on them like ‘one meter’ is used; the relation between the sample and the referent relied upon to determine the referent is that the index exhibits, or instantiates, the property referred to.¹¹

The main reason to characterize quotation as using the quoted material in this way as an index is that DT is thus in a position to account for the most distinctive aspect of quotation, while a well-known proposal by Tarski and Quine (as it is usually interpreted) cannot. Let us use ‘indexical mention’ to cover both autonomous and quotational mention. There is an alternative resource we sometimes use for mentioning expressions, namely, to introduce names for them by explicit stipulation (the use of ‘(1)’ in this article is a typical example). Logicians sometimes use ‘&’ as a name of this kind for the object-language expression signifying conjunction, which is not then presupposed to look like ‘&’. These names would refer to expressions the way a proper name refers to its bearer. Now, in addition to the non-systematic character of naming mention (as we may well call it) in contrast with indexical mention, there is an obvious difference between them; to wit, that in the latter case we can infer the referent from the referring expression itself, while we cannot do this in the former case.¹² It is in this sense that indexical mention has a pictographic character, which is not accounted for by (what is ordinarily taken to be) the Tarski-Quine view.¹³

2. Replies to New Objections to the Demonstrative Theory

We have thus introduced the main contenders to the debate, IT and DT. In the following paragraphs I will first provide responses to some new objections to DT. Then I will indicate the main difficulties for IT by discussing Reimer’s and Saka’s recent proposals, which as I said are better suited to confronting difficulties I put forward earlier for preceding versions.

A new criticism of DT has to do with occurrences of quotation-marks inside quotations. Consider (2):

(2) ‘‘Or’’ is a referring singular term.

(2) seems true. Saka (1998) contends, however, that the demonstrative theory counts it as plain non-sense. According to this view, Saka says, the grammatical subject of (2) consists of the outermost quotation-marks—a demonstrative—and a displayed token (consisting of a token of the left single quote, followed by a token of ‘or’, followed by a token of the right single quote). (2) is thus equivalent to (3):

(3) ‘Or’. That is a referring singular term.
Saka claims that we should now apply the Demonstrative rule to the quotation-marks surrounding the displayed material; in this way we get, as equivalent to (2), one of these nonsensical results: “Or. That that is a referring singular term”, or “Or. That. That is a referring singular term.” According to Saka, the only way of avoiding this absurdity is “for the recursive semantics of the language to freeze when it reaches quotations within quotations. But this move is empirically unsatisfactory, for English does not distinguish between exterior quote marks and interior quote marks except as a stylistic device [...] Furthermore, this move is theoretically ad hoc, as there is no independent motivation for treating quotation as the sole exception to the rule that syntactically recursive constructions possess recursive semantics” (Saka 1998, 120).

Let me adapt an example of Putnam’s, to see how little force there is in Saka’s argument. Imagine that we find a token of “‘or’” beautifully drawn in black on the ground; naturally enough, we assume it was intended to refer to ‘or’, for some linguistic purpose we cannot make out. Paying closer attention to the token, however, we see that it has in fact been accidentally formed by a colony of ants while pursuing their natural activities. We accordingly abandon our hypothesis that it was a referring expression. The intended lesson is that whether or not a pair of quotation-marks are doing (or helping to do) any referring depends (as with any other physical item which as a matter of fact instantiates a linguistic type) on whether or not it has been caused by the proper intentions; if it has not been caused in part by the intention that it be interpreted according to the conventional rule, it is not “ad hoc” to claim that they should not be so interpreted. Now, DT contends that the single quotes inside the outermost quotation-marks in (2) have not been produced to be interpreted according to the conventional rule associated with quotation-marks: they are there just as part of a non-linguistic index. Thus, it is not “ad hoc” to suppose that, in this case, the recursive semantics “freezes” after being used to interpret the outermost quotes. Moreover, no rule specific for quotation-marks of the kind envisaged by Saka should be invoked here; only the obvious general fact just pointed out about the missing referential intentions.

Gómez Torrente (2001, 132–4) provides a more plausible criticism based on similar cases. Remember that, if we interpret ‘referring singular term’ as applying only to linguistic expressions, DT has it that it is only the single quotes surrounding ‘or’ in (2) that make that claim true. We can imagine a critic taking this as refutation enough of DT, contending that, intuitively, it is not just the single quotes that are said to be a referring term in (2), but these single quotes together with the material inside. I would reject this envisaged criticism, which presupposes that intuitions about what is a conventional referring term count for the empirical evaluation of semantic theories; for I deny this. These are not the sort of intuitions to be accommodated by linguistic theories, but controversial theoretical judgments. (2)
is intuitively true, but DT can account for that intuition by taking ‘referring singular term’ to apply (as intuitively understood) to mixed signs composed of linguistic expressions and non-linguistic indexes.

Gómez Torrente’s criticism is more sophisticated than the imagined one just rejected, although it is related. He claims that the demonstrative account is incompatible with the truthfulness of sentences of the sort exemplified by (4):

(4) “‘Socrates’” refers to ‘Socrates’.

He takes these to be intuitively as clearly true as (5), which poses no difficulty for the Davidsonian

(5) ‘Socrates’ refers to Socrates.

Gómez-Torrente’s argument assumes that ‘refers’ signifies a relation between linguistic items and other entities; his argument is that the only linguistic item that, according to DT, the subject of (4) can refer to are the single quotes, which do not refer to ‘Socrates’.

My response is along the lines of the previous one to the imagined criticism. Firstly, I deny that intuitions regarding the truth or falsehood of (4), interpreting ‘refers’ in a theoretically precisified way, count for or against semantic theories. Secondly, if we put aside those arguable interpretations, DT has no problem in accounting for the intuitive truth of (4). Consider first (5), to help to clarify the matter. Given the context-dependence of proper names (many people are called ‘Socrates’), one who takes (5) to be true may be interpreting the second token of ‘Socrates’ as making a fully-fledged, contextually helped reference (say, to the famous Greek philosopher). In that case, it is not plausible to think that he interprets the subject of (5) as referring to the expression-type ‘Socrates’. He must be taking it as referring to a more restricted type, similarly disambiguated (one instantiated only by tokens with that reference), or perhaps to the token used after ‘refers to’. A second possibility (more plausible, in the context of Gómez Torrente’s discussion) is to interpret (5) schematically, with neither singular term properly functioning as such referentially. It would then convey something like “any properly used token of ‘Socrates’ refers to a Socrates, whoever he is”.

Corresponding interpretations for (4) are available to the defender of DT, assuming that the referring relation has in its domain not only linguistic terms, but also the mixed items contemplated by that view. Under a reading along the lines of the first one above for (5), the grammatical subject of (4) refers to a contextually relevant token of its quoted material; (4) says of it that it refers to the type ‘Socrates’, if we take this to be the reference of the grammatical object. This interpretation assumes that tokens can be in the
domain of the referring relation, but this is independently required for indexicals and demonstratives (see García-Carpintero 1998). The second, schematic reading is also more plausible in the context of Gómez Torrente’s discussion, and more straightforward. (4) conveys then that tokens of the type exemplified by the quoted material in its grammatical subject (tokens of the type consisting of the left single quote, followed by ‘Socrates’, followed by the right single quote, i.e., mixed signs consisting of a linguistic expression—quotation marks—and tokens of ‘Socrates’ acting as non-linguistic indexes) refer (typically) to a ‘Socrates’ expression (a token, or a type of any of the different possible varieties, the linguistic ‘Socrates’ type, its graphic manifestation, its cursive manifestation, and so on and so forth), whatever it is.

Another criticism of DT is that “removing the quoted expression results always in ungrammaticality. If we remove ‘Socrates’ from ‘‘Socrates’ has eight letters’ and write ‘‘ has eight letters,’’ the inscription strikes us as grammatically incorrect,” while it is not “ungrammatical” according to DT, only referentially unsuccessful (ibid., 130). However, ‘ungrammatical’ here begs too many questions. Ordinary speakers would certainly find such an utterance infelicitous, but they would also find so one of ‘that has eight letters’, or ‘that is big’ produced in contexts where no relevant demonstration takes place. We should not trust mere intuitions to make distinctions between theoretically different kinds of infelicity.

Finally, Gómez Torrente offers a criticism that depends on a common confusion about the nature of semantic theorizing. He points out that with demonstrative phrases of the sort used to make explicit the semantic content of quotation-marks, according to the demonstrative theory, we can make claims that could not be made with the corresponding quotation-marks. For instance, he says (ibid., 131–2), in the proper contextual setting (6) could be used to make a true claim about its subject:

(6) The expression of which this is a token has eight words.

This can be taken to predicate something true of ‘the expression of which this is a token’; something similar could be said of any other phrase which could be used to make explicit the content that the demonstrative theory attributes to quotation-marks. However, quotation-marks themselves cannot be used to achieve similar results; they cannot be used to make true claims about themselves, as in the inadequate (7):

(7) “” is spatially discontinuous.

Even if that is so, however, this form of criticism would only be compelling to the extent that a certain presupposition were acceptable: whenever an expression attempts to make theoretically explicit the semantic content of another, for the theory to be correct, the former should not be available to
perform linguistic tasks for which the latter is inappropriate. This is a demanding condition, requiring a correspondingly compelling justification that Gómez Torrente does not provide.

In fact, I do not think that any justification for such a claim is forthcoming. Making theoretically explicit the semantic content of an expression is a different “language game” than using that expression. It is to be expected that the explicit form could be put to tasks for which the explicated expression is not available, and vice-versa. I cannot see how any of these possibilities can constitute a criticism of the purported semantic proposal, either in general or in the specific case we have been considering.

Recanati’s (2001) main criticisms are based on cases of what he calls ‘open quotation’, like (8) and (9), in which a quotation does not occupy the role of a singular term; his criticism is that, according to DT, there would be a dangling singular term in them, “a singular term without a sentence frame in which to fit” (*op. cit.*, 654):

(8) Stop that John! ‘Nobody likes me’, ‘I am miserable’…Don’t you think you exaggerate a bit?
(9) Quine says that quotation ‘…has a certain anomalous feature’.

My reply is the one he considers, and rejects; namely, that the material required to make these sentences grammatical is implicitly understood: a parenthetical (*as he puts it*) after ‘quotation’, say, in the case of (9). Recanati finds views of this sort “convoluted and gratuitous” (*op. cit.*, 657). I leave it for the reader to judge the convolutedness of the present view in comparison with Recanati’s own theory (*op. cit.*, sec. 5). As for gratuitousness, I think that any systematic account of natural language will have to deal in similar terms with the fact that actual speech uses all kind of resources for expediency (in the case of (8), a form of non-deceptive simulation or make-believe).

3. The Problem with New Versions of the Identity Theory

I now move on to a critical discussion of more recent versions of IT. Reimer’s view shares with orthodox versions of that view the claim that the quoted material in quotational mention is a linguistic expression, and also the claim that autonymous mention is linguistically unproblematic. Her version of IT differs from previous ones concerning the semantic subcategory of singular terms inside which this linguistic expression referring to itself in indexical mention is to be included: according to her proposal, the quoted material—the referring expression in quotation—is a demonstrative; quotation-marks, in her view, play the role of a *demonstratio*. This accounts nicely for autonymous mention: it occurs when the referential intentions of the speaker are sufficiently clear so that a demonstration is not required.14 This is why quotation-marks are more needed in
writing; the context does not make the speaker’s intentions so perspicuous there (Reimer 1996, 140).

Reimer’s version of IT also deals nicely with the problem I raised for the identity proposal in my earlier paper, i.e. that in indexical mention we do not merely refer to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use. In taking the quoted material to be a demonstrative, Reimer’s version of IT meets this challenge. If quoted materials are demonstratives, as Reimer contends, it is their tokens that are to be ascribed a reference. The theory is then free to formulate the linguistic rule associated with the type along the lines of the DT rule: in the default case, the reference of a given token of a quoted material is the linguistic type it exhibits; under further, contextually indicated circumstances, it can be an entity otherwise related to the token (other features that the token instantiates, a related token of the same type, and so on). Reimer’s proposal thus improves on previous versions of IT. There remains, however, a consideration favoring DT. Reimer’s version of IT captures, as the traditional version does not, the fact that a common mechanism is in operation when one and the same expression-type is used as an index to mention a range of entities. However, by being a version of IT, it cannot capture a related point; namely, that this same mechanism is also in operation when expressions of different types (indeed, non-expressions too) are mentioned in indexical quotation.

Reimer’s version of IT differs from DT in that, according to DT, quoted materials in indexical mention are merely non-linguistic signs, while on Reimer’s view they are indexical linguistic expressions. Now, the best models we have to account for the semantics of indexicals and demonstratives posit two factors: a linguistic rule associated with a linguistic type (thus accounting for the semantic commonalities between different uses of that type), and a truth-conditional import assigned to their tokens, or contextualized types (thus accounting for the potential differences in truth-conditional import). Given that Reimer’s proposal is a version of IT, there cannot be anything playing the role of the first element in all cases of indexical mention; there cannot be a type instantiated in all cases of the phenomenon, with which a common linguistic rule is associated. On her view, whenever tokens of different expression-types are used for mentioning, different demonstrative-types are also involved; otherwise, it would not be correct to say that the token of ‘Boston’ in an utterance of (1) involving autonymous mention is a linguistic expression that, by default, refers to itself, and her view would not be a version of IT. According to Reimer’s view, thus, every natural language includes as many demonstrative-types as it includes expression-types. Indeed, in view of the fact that we can use for indexical mention graphic and spoken material belonging to other languages (or to no used language), Reimer should also contend that some of the types they instantiate are also demonstrative expressions of English.
This is not intuitively correct. The use of expressive devices like quotation-marks evinces the perception that a common semantic procedure applies in all cases, which disregards the type of the quoted material: whenever any expression is quoted, a common token-reflexive “picturing” rule operates. Whenever ‘I’ is used, the same indexical rule is operating, one different from the indexical rule operating whenever ‘you’ is used. Reimer’s proposal has it that, analogously, whenever ‘Henry’ is quoted, the same indexical rule is operating, one different from the indexical rule operating whenever ‘Richard’ is quoted. This does not seem right. The same indexical rule is operating whenever we quote any expression whatsoever, and also whenever we quote quotable material that does not instantiate any expression-type. If an indexical rule is operating here, the models we have for indexicals suggest that it should be one associated with a type that is present no matter what the quoted type is; quotation-marks are the most obvious candidate. Reimer could be counting types in a non-standard way; she could be assuming that all quotable items instantiate a common very abstract type (defined perhaps just by the property of being a possible expression), which is what (in context) does the referring, and what is associated with her indexical rule. But this proposal is not a version of IT, for that abstract expression-type is not referring to itself in default contexts. The suggested proposal is only a variant of DT, according to which autonymous mention involves a linguistic expression, a peculiar form of quotation-marks consisting in that very abstract type instantiated by all quotable materials.

Let me summarize the argument. Both DT and Reimer’s version of IT are demonstrative accounts of quotation. Both rely on the existing models for indexicals and demonstratives, which posit a linguistic rule associated with each distinct demonstrative type, on the basis of which the truth-conditional import of every token (or type-in-context) of that type is determined. They differ as follows. DT takes quotation-marks to be the demonstrative type, something common to cases in which different types are quoted. Thus, DT makes do with a single linguistic demonstrative rule operating in cases in which different types are quoted. (Its problem, of course, is to account for cases of mention in which quotation-marks are not present.) Reimer’s theory, being a version of IT, must assume a different demonstrative rule whenever different types are quoted; for IT is the view that quotation is a case of self-reference, and when ‘Henry’ and ‘Richard’ are quoted, by default different types are referred to. This makes DT preferable to this version of IT. For the motivation for adopting a demonstrative version of IT was to explain how by quoting we may refer not only to linguistic types, but to other entities too, using the same semiotic procedure. However, by the same token that the same semiotic procedure is intuitively involved when we use two tokens of ‘Henry’ to refer in one case to the linguistic type, and in the other to its graphic version, the same procedure is
intuitively involved when we use ‘Henry’ and ‘Richard’ to refer to the corresponding types. DT captures this intuition, but no version of IT can.

This criticism notwithstanding, there is an element of Reimer’s view that I think DT should adopt: that in quotational mention quotation-marks serve not only as demonstratives, but as demonstrations too. Such a double role is possible because the demonstrated index is in the specific case of quotation part of the utterance. But the quoted material in quotational mention is in any case functioning only as a non-linguistic index, and even more so in autonomous mention, where no linguistic expression is in charge of indicating how the sample is to be taken. (Unless we adopted the suggestion at the end of the last but one paragraph.) This accounts properly for the fact that it is possible to quote an infinite number of different expressions, and even non-expressions, by always resorting to a common mechanism.

Finally, I will discuss Saka’s proposal. I have to acknowledge first that, although I have been classifying it as a version of IT, he explicitly rejects this. I will argue that his rejection depends on verbal issues, and that Saka’s theory is sufficiently close to Reimer’s demonstrative version of IT for it to fail for the same reasons. The essentials of Saka’s view are as follows. Any token of a linguistic expression, he claims, ostends multiple entities; among them, the linguistic type it instantiates (in its graphic and phonic versions), the ordinary extension of the type, and its intension. When the token is used, it refers to its ordinary extension. When it is mentioned (in cases of what I have been calling “autonomous mention”), and also when it is quoted (my “quotational mention”), it conventionally refers to something other than its ordinary extension (in the latter case, so does the entire quotation, quoted material plus quotation-marks): it may refer to itself, to a related token, to the type it ostends, to its intension, etc. (See Saka 1998, pp. 125–128 for details.) The proposal, thus, shares with IT the claim that was previously shown to be its distinguishing feature, namely, that in autonomous mention the referring sign is a linguistic expression that refers to itself.

Moreover, by taking tokens as the referring expressions, Saka’s proposal counts also, like Reimer’s, as a context-dependent version of IT. (A difference with Reimer’s proposal is that quotation-marks are not demonstrations according to Saka, but “discontinuous determiners” which provide an optional conventional means for mentioning.) We can take tokens of singular terms in eternal sentences to be referring expressions, but we are not forced to do so; the types themselves can be counted as such in that case. It is only with sentences including context-dependent expressions that we must take tokens (or types-in-context) to be the referring expressions. Taking tokens to be the referring expressions, however, is essential for Saka’s view; for it is only in this way that he can be justified in claiming that his proposal—like Reimer’s—accounts for the fact that quotations can refer
not only to types, but also to other entities. In that sense his proposal treats the referring signs in both autonymous and quotational mention as expressions akin to demonstratives. Saka rejects DT, as follows: “I do not think that the quote marks function deictically (and hence referentially). In the first place, it is possible for a quotation to refer to something that is not physically present, as in the case of word meanings and word types. Second, it is possible to forego the use of quote marks altogether” (Saka 1998, p. 129). The second point does not distinguish Saka’s views from a demonstrative account like Reimer’s, in which it is the quoted material that is a demonstrative. The first is a non-sequitur; for, of course, we do use demonstratives to refer to abstract entities, including meanings (‘this type is easier to describe than that’, ‘that meaning can only be expressed in Spanish by a complex phrase’).

Saka’s considerations for distinguishing his view from IT are mostly verbal. One is that “on my account the quotation as a whole (quoted material plus quote marks) is referential. For the Identity Theory, the quoted material alone refers” (ibid., p. 129). I do not think this is correct. I take IT to be the view that the quoted material is a linguistic referential expression referring to itself; it is compatible with this to assign also a referential role to the whole quotation. A second argument is “that my [i.e., Saka’s] account treats an expression as a quotation or not depending on its linguistic structure, whereas the Identity Theory treats quotation as a matter of function” (ibid.). This, however, is based on a verbal stipulation. Saka only applies ‘quotation’ to cases of quotational mention. It is then true that his account treats an expression as a quotation only if it includes a certain discontinuous determiner, quotation-marks; i.e., depending on its linguistic structure. However, as we have seen, he shares with IT the distinguishing feature of that view, an account of autonymous mention which treats the quoted material there as a linguistic expression. Less misleadingly, then, we could put in our terminology his view as follows: indexical mention is sometimes a matter of function (in autonymous mention) and sometimes a matter of linguistic structure (in quotational mention). When the point is put this way, no real difference with the identity theory remains. Saka’s theory is essentially a demonstrative version of IT, like Reimer’s; it thus presents the same difficulties as the latter, which I have already noted above.

Let me summarize the main points I have made before concluding. Firstly, I have claimed that the real theoretical divide between DT and IT concerns what the quoted materials are considered to be; DT considers them non-linguistic signs, for IT they are linguistic. Secondly, I have argued that the main argument in favor of DT is made particularly perspicuous when neo-identity theorists like Reimer and Saka concede and try to account for the point that a common semantic procedure is involved when tokens of the same expression-type are used to mention the type, the tokens themselves, or other related entities like italics, etc., it. For then, there seems to be little
reason to deny that this same mechanism also operates when tokens of different expression-types – or even non-expressions – are used for these purposes. There is then little reason to associate a distinct linguistic rule embodying the procedure with every linguistic type, as the distinguishing feature of IT requires them to do. Rather, the operation of such a linguistic rule is conventionally signaled by tokens of a linguistic type which, properly speaking, should be instantiated whenever implementing the communicative intentions of the speakers requires indexical mentioning: i.e., quotation-marks, in any of their forms.

In defending earlier a Gricean line to account for autonomous mention on behalf of the demonstrative theorists, I acknowledged that I had incurred two obligations, the easier of which was discharged then. The present considerations discharge the other. A claim that a certain use is non-literal (especially if the use is common enough, as in “generalized implicatures”) must be justified on the grounds that it is required to keep the complexity of linguistic conventions to a reasonable minimum. We have to show that the way the phrase under examination is used in an indisputably conventional way in many other linguistic constructions is such that, by taking the disputed cases as equally conventional, we would be committed to a characterization of the relevant linguistic conventions that would be more convoluted than is reasonable. This is what I have been trying to show in the above paragraphs for the case of quotation. If we counted autonomous mention as literal – the way IT would have us do—well-established models for indexicals would force us to assume that every linguistic expression (and also every possible type of any non-linguistic quotable material) is linguistically associated with a linguistic rule (in addition to the semantic rule with which it is associated, if any) on the basis of which tokens of it are used by default to refer to the exhibited type itself, non-ordinarily to refer to other entities related with the token. This attributes to our practices many more rules than seems needed.

Notes

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1 Given DT, this implies that italicization is a demonstrative expression, a view that Marga Reimer deems “absurd” (1996, 135). She does not say why; perhaps she thinks that only word-like entities (strings, spatial or temporal parts of speech) can be linguistic expressions. If so, she is wrong; natural and artificial languages essentially use expressive resources that are not at all word-like. To illustrate, when we write in a first-order language ‘aRa’, we convey thereby that a binary relation holds between something and itself by using two tokens of the same type, ‘a’. This is an expressive resource that characterizes in part the expressed content (it is a “logical”
feature, to be preserved in every model for the formula); the same content-feature is signified in natural language with other, more word-like expressive resources, i.e., by using anaphoric pronouns. Similarly, which of the two thematic roles in the relation of one object hitting another plays the referent of a noun is signified in Latin by a word-like expression (the accusative inflection); in English, however, it is signified by a different kind of syntactic feature. Also (as Adéle Mercier suggested to me) intonation is a non-word-like resource analogous to italicization, linguistically used in speech to mark, say, focus, and, of course, quotation too.

2 Conventional quotation-marks have their own limitations, as showed by an example by Boolos (1995) which he uses to report an observation of Michael Ernst. Thus, the sentence ‘a’ concatenated with ‘b’ is an expression can be interpreted as predicating expressionhood of ‘ab’, or rather of a ‘concatenated with’ b. As Boolos suggests, this ambiguity could be eliminated by using subscripted quotation-marks, with the subscripts helping to pair the opening and closing quotation. If ambiguities like this were frequent, the introduction of such a device would be helpful. Otherwise, the contextually salient referential intentions of speakers are quite enough to disambiguate the cases that may arise.

3 Saka (1998, 118) misunderstands this point. Firstly, no matter how liberally we understand the concept of a shape, tokens are not shapes; and, in any case, the problem I pointed out (see my 1994, p. 259) was that it is not necessarily a shape instantiated by the exhibited token that we refer to by means of it.

4 Analogous remarks could be made regarding verbs that require an object – a spoken version of “he pronounced ‘the’”, say; these can be extended to “pro-drop” languages too.

5 An anonymous referee suggested that I should warn the reader at this point that Recanati (2001) uses the expression ‘autonymous mention’ to refer to what I call ‘quotational mention’. I am sorry for the confusion this might cause; the bulk of the paper was written before I came across Recanati’s paper.

6 Wittgenstein’s ultimate aim is to establish that, even if the application of natural language expressions like ‘crimson’ is constitutively governed by their relation to mental samples (which, I think, he would certainly grant), those samples are also signs, ruled by norms giving rise to a distinction between correct and incorrect cases of application.

7 In my previous contribution (1994, p. 263) I gave a shorter sketch of the Gricean derivation to avoid verbosity. I have elaborated on it given that Saka says that “Garcia-Carpintero’s aversion to conversational implicature is left undeveloped, and I have no clue how it might go” (Saka 1998, 119).

8 In spoken language, most conventional resources for quotation (intonation, etc.) are, like italicization in written language, not word-like. If we think that there are good linguistic reasons to accept that, in languages like English, a well-formed sentence must have a word-like subject—as opposed to merely some expression playing that syntactic role—then the Davidsonian will have to take the Gricean line even for sentences where those quoting devices are used; the devices would then be interpreted as helping the audience to realize that a non-literal content is meant, and what that content is about. Following Washington, Reimer assumes that there are such good linguistic reasons (Reimer 1996, 135). I am not so sure. I do not feel compelled, as my colleagues seem to be, to defer to linguists on these matters, because no linguist that I know of has gone into the facts of quotation deeper than philosophers have, and a comprehensive theory should also take those facts of quotation into account.

9 This may seem to involve more than a minor revision of Davidson’s proposal: “On my theory the inscription inside does not refer to anything at all, nor is it part of an expression that does. On the demonstrative theory, neither the quotation as a whole (quotes plus filling) nor the filling alone is, except by accident, a singular term” (Davidson 1979, p. 90). However, the context makes it clear that Davidson uses ‘to refer’ only for linguistic expressions, and that he only contemplates linguistic “terms”. I do not think that there is in this any substantial disagreement between my proposal and Davidson’s.
Garcia-Carpintero (2001) provides some examples of criticisms of Gricean explanations based on the presupposition, and elaborates on the sketched reasons why it is unmotivated.

In my previous contribution (1994), I put this same Wittgensteinian point in more Wittgensteinian terms, by introducing the notion of ostensive signs.

Assuming, of course, that we are familiar with the relevant relation between index and intended referent. Bennett (1988) makes interesting points about this, making clear the extent to which this depends on social and psychological facts about human communities.

I have been careful to attribute the view that identifies indexical mention with naming mention to Tarski and Quine because Gómez Torrente (2001) argues that this common interpretation of Tarski and Quine is wrong. Similar claims had been made earlier by Bennett (1988) and Richard (1986). According to Gómez Torrente’s interpretation, Tarski’s and Quine’s only semantic contention is that the quoted material in quotational mention does not contribute to the proposition expressed in the speech act its ordinary referent. Tarski, however, says that according to the interpretation “most natural and completely in accordance with the customary way of using quotation-marks”, the single constituents of quotations, “quotation marks and the expressions standing between them—fulfill the same function as the letters and complexes of successive letters in single words. Hence they can possess no independent meaning... [a quotation is thus] a name of the same nature of the proper name of a man” (Tarski 1935, pp. 159–60).

I do not think this can be read as saying merely that the quoted material does not contribute to the proposition its ordinary referent. Given that “letters and complexes of successive letters in single words” do not make any referential contribution to the proposition signified in uttering the meaning-vehicles where they occur, the text says in addition that the quoted material in quotation does not contribute in any way either. In particular, it is not a non-linguistic index, against what DT claims, and still less a linguistic referring expression with a referent different from the one it has in other contexts, as IT contends. Similar remarks could be made about Quine’s view: “From the standpoint of logical analysis each whole quotation must be regarded as a single word or sign, whose parts count for no more than serifs or syllables” (Quine 1940, p. 26). Given the similarity between the two graphic features, I take the reference to serifs to intimate the identification of the semantic roles of quotation-marks and serifs. If so, and given that serifs not only lack their ordinary reference when they occur (they ordinarily have none, of course), but do not make any contribution whatsoever to the proposition expressed, Quine’s text also appears to say that quotation-marks lack any truth-conditional import. Also, the reference to “syllables” suggests a corresponding claim about the quoted material. Tarski’s and Quine’s relevant texts appear thus to deny to quotations a semantic structure, whose recognition—along the lines either of DT or IT—is essential to explaining the productivity and pictographicity of quotational mention.

Some theorists take demonstrations to be acts like pointing gestures, which usually accompany the use of demonstratives. In some cases, however, the demonstrative intentions of speakers are manifest enough, without the use of any such gesture. In part because of this, other theorists take demonstrations to be specifically demonstrative intentions. (See the discussion of these issues in the first section of García-Carpintero 1998.) Under the second alternative, Reimer’s proposal would be that quotation-marks are, rather than demonstrations, their usual manifestations used for mentioning; it is then these external manifestations, rather than the demonstrations themselves, which are suppressed in autonymous mention.

An anonymous referee suggested this possibility.

In any case, I do not think Reimer would accept this proposal. As I said earlier, when I suggested that italicization and intonation are conventional expressive resources playing according to DT a demonstrative role analogous to ordinary quotation-marks (fn. 1), Reimer describes such a view as “absurd” (Reimer 1996, 135); I suppose that the view that all quoted materials instantiate the same abstract type, a demonstrative contextually referring to something contextually related to the token instantiating it, should be equally absurd by her lights.

Or conventional manifestations thereof; see footnote 14.
References

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