Abstract
The utterance of any expression $x$ ostends or makes manifest the customary referent of $x$, $x$ itself, and related matter. If $x$ appears in quotation marks then the presumed intention behind the utterance is to pick out something other than the customary referent (either instead of it or in addition to it). The consequences of these ideas, taken from my 1998 work, are here drawn out in application to a variety of quotations: metalinguistic citation, reported speech, scare-quoting, echo-quoting, loan words, and titles.

My earlier work on quotation makes several claims – call them theses, if you will. (T1) Every speech act creates multiple ostensions. For instance, in saying *hippopotamus* one ostends, or makes manifest, a sequence of sounds or letters, a lexeme, a concept, a referent, and more. (T2) Ostension makes it possible for a speaker not only to draw attention to such ostensibles, but to recognizably intend to do so. (T3) Consequently any expression may be either used or mentioned. (T4) Quotation marks are used to signal mentioning, and thus serve to disambiguate. (T5) Quotations may be used for many reasons, e.g. reporting speech, scare-quoting, metalinguistic citation. (T6) Quotations, i.e. quotation marks plus quoted matter, refer to quoted matter; quotation marks by themselves do not. (T7) At least some versions of the Identity Theory are mistaken. (T8) The Description Theory is mistaken, quotations are not descriptions. (T9) The Demonstrative Theory is mistaken, quotation marks are not demonstratives. (T10) The Name Theory is mistaken, quotations are not names.

These claims variously call for elaboration, fresh justification, and emendation. (T10) The Name Theory no longer has any proponents so far as I can tell. Philosophy does make progress! (T9) New arguments against the Demonstrative Theory are so considerable as to fill their own paper: Saka (2004b). (T8) Description Theories ultimately invoke proper names, demonstratives, or displays and hence should respectively be classified as versions of the Name, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Treating them as a distinct and unified group, as I and others did earlier, is infelicitous. (T7)
Though I continue to find the Identity Theory’s label troubling, I have acquired deeper appreciation for its substance from Washington (1992) and Reimer (1996). My own work goes beyond theirs, possibly in ways they would disapprove of, but it belongs to the same family. It also has affinities with Geurts & Maier (this volume).

(T6) To be precise, speakers refer; expressions do not. Language consists of speech acts and their underlying competence, not lifeless soundwaves/inkblots and not abstract objects. Although it is sometimes convenient to speak as if expressions refer, such talk is loose and potentially misleading. The speech-act/competence point of view captures that which denotational/truth-conditional semantics misses – that interpretations are constructed dynamically and imaginatively.

(T5) Quotations may be used for assorted purposes. Yet these purposes, by and large, are special cases of one phenomenon. (In contrast, for instance, capitalization serves to mark proper names and sentence beginnings, which are unrelated: we do not want a unifying theory of capitalization.) The bulk of this paper is dedicated to showing how different kinds of quotation can be explained on the basis of the same underlying principles, namely T4 – the central thesis of my original paper – and T3. T2, a peripheral point, is justified by T1 and further defended in Saka (2004b).

Section 1 situates T1 in my larger Deweyan (naturalistic, irrealist, and open-ended) outlook. Section 2 defends T2 and T3. The remainder of the paper is devoted to T4-T6, especially T5. To the extent that the present work is plausible, it supports T7-T10.

1. Ostension and Construction: Principle (P)

Every time you vocalize you vibrate the air, and in so doing you make manifest to your audience certain phonetic phenomena. The phonetic phenomena, in turn, activate phonological representations in the audience, which in turn trigger recognition of lexical entries including conceptual content and projections of syntactic structures (multiple sets thereof in the case of lexico-syntactic ambiguity), eventuating in referential models. What’s more, the route from sound to referent is robust. Thus, I can plead “don’t think of ferocious furry-footed caterpillars”, and you will think of ferocious furry-footed caterpillars. All I have done is present some ink, but the ink, or more directly speaking your perception of it, willy-nilly caused you to think of something other than the ink. In short, speech acts directly ostend sounds and thereby deferringly ostend, according to principles of association, lexemes and mental models (for more on ostension, see Saka 1998: 125).
The foregoing is a false idealization, of course, assuming as it does that language comprehension works entirely bottom-up. Still, it is accurate enough for the sake of illustrating some facts of ostension/association and for introducing my thoughts on conceptual content and referential models.

A “referential” model is one aspect of a mental model (cf. Fauconnier 1994; Jackendoff 1992; Johnson-Laird 1983; Lakoff 1987; and Talmy 2000). Strictly speaking, mental models do not contain referents at all. Being in the mind, they are subjective and may be populated by phantasmagoria. Nonetheless, for present purposes mental models can be said to correspond to the world (or not) and to serve as objects of thought (belief, speculation, desire, ...). They are partially language-independent, such that speakers of different languages have similar, though not identical, kinds of models. They are far from sentence-like, standing in a relation to contextualized sentences that is many-many, contra truth-conditional semantics.

Mental models are built and revised according to perception, to inference, and to instructions as provided by the conceptual content of linguistic expressions. Because concepts relate to aspects of referential models, they might be said to have “extensions”. In this manner some of my claims can be ported into a realist framework such as Frege’s, Montague’s, or Davidson’s, though plausibility may be lost on the way. (For instance, appeals to ostension would lose force: in saying play-dough I make manifest one’s representation of play-dough, not play-dough itself.)

Interpretation, or the construction of mental models, involves opportunistic problem-solving and invention. We use whatever tools and resources are at hand in order to figure out speaker’s intent, and we do so according to constraints, for instance we follow the preference ordering of using what is most salient first (Sperber and Wilson 1986).

I begin with a simple example. In saying (1) the speaker ostends (a-d).

(1) Anna sees Bob,
   (1a) /Anna sees Bob/
   (1b) [Anna][sees][Bob]]
   (1c) ANNA SEES BOB
   (1d) |Anna sees Bob|

The phonological form in (a) activates the lexico-syntactic items in (b) which trigger the concepts in (c) which serve as instructions for building/accessing the model specified in (d). What’s more, the audience attends to the sequencing of what is ostended, knowing that such is relevant to semantic structure: ANNA is ostended at time or position t1, SEES at t2, and BOB at t3. The concept SEES contains the instruction to look left (earlier) for the subject and right for the object. Knowing this allows us to get to the model in (d), which corresponds
for our purposes to the “proposition” that Anna sees Bob. (Proposition-talk carries baggage, some of it innocuous.)

In implementing the instructions provided by conceptual content, the audience does not select from a pre-established range of possible models, but actively constructs one (or more) using the intelligence of executive agency. Yet conceptual content is executed automatically. This, the primary principle of all language use, has a corollary that can be formulated in terms of the speaker (cf. the Use Hypothesis of Predelli, this volume).

(P) In uttering any expression \( x \), S defeasibly intends for the audience to execute \( x \)’s lexico-syntactically specified conceptual content.

Principle (P) will combine with principle (Q) to explain much about quotation.

2. Use and Mention: Principle (Q)

Use and mention have both vernacular and technical senses. In the vernacular, to mention is simply to refer to; and to use, make use of, or employ an expression is to speak some syllables or scrawl some scratchmarks with any number of intentions, or none at all. Certain intentions yield use and mention in the following technical senses.

(u) Speaker S uses an expression \( x \) if and only if:
   (i) S produces a token of \( x \), thereby ostending an open-ended number of items associated with \( x \); and
   (ii) S intends to refer to the extension of \( x \).

(m) Speaker S mentions an expression \( x \) if and only if:
   (i) S produces a token of \( x \), thereby ostending an open-ended number of items associated with \( x \); and
   (ii) S intends to refer to something associated with \( x \) other than its extension.

This analysis calls for several clarifications.

(i) The use-mention distinction is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. An expression may be simply used (2), simply mentioned (2’), or simultaneously used and mentioned (2”).

(2) Motown is the home of some good music.
(2’) Motown alludes to Detroit’s motor industry.
(2”) I grew up near Motown.
In addition an expression may go neither used nor mentioned, e.g. when emitted by parrots (Tsohatzidis 2004).

(ii) What do I mean by reference? Recanati (2001: 648) suggests that reference requires predication. This is mistaken, however. If I scream “my baby!” while my neighbors keep me from running into my burning house, then I refer to my baby without predicking anything of it. It seems sufficient, for referring one’s audience to X, to draw the audience’s attention to X, to “pick out” X. In the case of *linguistic* reference, the speaker refers by means of a conventional *verbal* element. In short, the predication of an element is not necessary for its being referential, although predicatability is sufficient. 2

(iii) How is it possible, if using involves ostending an extension, to use particles such as *the*, which have no extension? The answer is that particles do not lack extension, if extensions are equated for instance with “customary Bedeutungen”. The extension of a particle in isolation cannot be picked out, granted, but it can nonetheless be characterized: the extension of *the* in sentence P is that which contributes to the extension of P, which in turn is a (represented) state of affairs.

(iv) My analyses invoke speaker intentions. If intention were dropped from (u) then the first word in (2’) would mistakenly count as used; and if intention were dropped from (m) then, arguably, no word would ever count as mentioned.

Because I invoke intentions, Cappelen & Lepore (C&L) (1999a: 746) accuse me of Humpty-Dumptyism. This charge actually smears together two distinct doctrines: first that intentions contribute to meaning; and second that intentions can arbitrarily be whatever one wants them to be. But the latter is obviously false, for intentions in general depend on expectations. In particular, linguistic expectations depend both on internalized norms built up from summations of experience with others in one’s language community and on general language-transcendent principles of cognition. (You cannot intend to fly no matter how hard you want or try to or set your mind to. You can intend to do only that which you believe you are capable of doing, and in this way intending differs from desiring, hoping, and attempting; you cannot use the word *glory*, as Humpty Dumpty does, in order to mean ‘a knock-down argument’.) Derogatory imputations of Humpty-Dumptyism misapprehend the nature of intention.

To suppose that intentions play some role in linguistic phenomena is not necessarily to advocate Gricean intention-based semantics, which would indeed be controversial. My commitment to a modicum of intentionalism is rooted in the unexciting idea that when I say *pepperoni* I refer to either pepperoni or green pepper depending on something vaguely intentional, be it my intention (to speak English or German); the intention ascribed to me by my
interpreter; the social/physical context of my utterance, as categorized by intentional norms (e.g. being in England or in Germany); etc. (cf. Predelli, this volume: §3). When C&L (this volume: §2) deny altogether the relevance of intentions and context to semantic function, they seem to forget that words have meaning only in languages, and that a word cannot be in a language unless it is connected to some intentional agent, be it speaker or interpreter.3

3 Another misunderstanding of (m) appears in C&L (1999a: 748): “the disagreement between Saka and us is not about whether Giorgione is referred to in (3), but about what’s doing the referring. According to Saka, it’s Giorgione itself, according to us it is the so.”

(3) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.

C&L are mistaken. First, in claiming that Giorgione is mentioned, I made a claim only about what the speaker does, not what the name does. In saying Giorgione in the context of (3), the speaker intends to make both the painter and the name cognitively accessible, to “pick out” or refer to them. This follows from the technical conception of mentioning at hand, (m). Second, this is all compatible with S’s using the pro-form so to refer to Giorgione. That S does so is obvious.

Thus concludes my general framework and definition of use/mention. I turn now to quotation, which formally marks the mentioning function.

(Q) In uttering an expression in quotation marks, S defeasibly mentions it.

Primary principle (P) and quotational principle (Q) combine to help explain the interpretation of scare quotes, metalinguistic citation, italicized loan words, discourse reports, acknowledged allusions, and titles.

3. Scare Quotes

Speakers draw attention to their word choices for any number of editorializing reasons. A textbook author may implicitly mean ‘here is jargon, don’t forget it’; a scholar may mean ‘here is loose language, and I recognize as much’; the haughty may mean ‘here is slang I do not identify with’. To alert the audience to such pedagogical, cautionary, and distancing intents, the speaker uses scare quotes.

(4) Solids and liquids are “condensed phases”.

In saying (4), S draws attention to (i) the proposition that solids and liquids are condensed phases, and (ii) the term [condensed phase]. Just as it is up to the audience to infer why (i) is being made manifest – it could be for assertion, hypothesizing, or whatnot – so it is up to the audience to infer why (ii) is being made manifest.

We might say as a first approximation, then, that expressions containing quotations have two components of meaning. The first is just the kind of meaning that all plain expressions have, the kind that derives from (P) as presented at the end of §1. The second derives from the specifically quotational principle (Q) from the end of §2. Putting together (P) and (Q) yields

(PQ) In uttering an expression having quotation marks, S defeasibly intends for the audience to execute its conceptual content and to refer to something related to the quoted portion other than its extension.

Accordingly, in saying (4), S intends for us to execute SOLIDS AND LIQUIDS ARE CONDENSED PHASES, i.e. to build the proposition that solids and liquids are condensed phases, and also to attend especially to the term [condensed phase]. Perhaps we are supposed to remember it, perhaps we are supposed to realize that it is being implicitly defined, perhaps S has some other reason in mind.

To repeat the lesson of §1, customary non-quotational use of language is automatic. Adding quotation marks allows for a new use that may but need not displace the old. In treating the quoted matter in (5) as a sort of noun phrase, I do not treat it as only a noun phrase; if logical forms existed, that of (5) would be not (5’) but more nearly (5”).

(5) Quine says that quotation “is anomalous”.
(5’) Quine says that quotation Tom.
(5”) Quine says that quotation is anomalous. Tom

Hence the criticism of C&L (1999a: 748), Simchen (1999: 331), and Abbott (this volume: §3.2) is unsound.4

Yet principle (PQ) might be questioned on other grounds.

(6) Jack “fortuitously” bumped into Jill.

According to (PQ), S uses (6) to mean that Jack fortuitously bumped into Jill, and that we are to pause over the word choice fortuitously. But it doesn’t seem that (6) means that Jack fortuitously bumped into Jill. Thus there is an intuitive difference between two uses of scare quotes. In the strict case (4) the quoted
matter is both used and mentioned; in the loose case (6) the quoted matter is mentioned without being used. To solve the problem of loose-speech scare quotes, I shall sketch a resemblance account and explain why I favor it over others.

3.1 The Resemblance Account

Due to the laws of human linguistic competence, verbal stimuli are associated with words, concepts, and extensions; e.g. *fortuitously* is associated with /fortuitously/, [fortuitously], FORTUITOUSLY, and |fortuitously|. Because associations are also based on the more general cognitive principle of resemblance, there is a mentally apprehended relation between that which is strictly F and that which comes close. Thus, if Jack meets Jill, and the encounter has the appearance of being both accidental and fortunate but is actually contrived or unfortunate, then the meeting resembles a fortuitous one without being so; it is quasi-fortuitous. Hence the results of reading (6) include the following sequences.

(6a)  JACK /fortuitously/ BUMPED INTO JILL
(6b)  JACK [fortuitously] BUMPED INTO JILL
(6c)  JACK FORTUITOUSLY BUMPED INTO JILL
(6d)  JACK QUASI-FORTUITOUSLY BUMPED INTO JILL

It’s not possible to execute (a) or (b). Executing (c) and (d), however, does yield propositions.

(6e)  |Jack fortuitously bumped into Jill|
(6f)  |Jack bumped into Jill in a way that resembles the fortuitous|

The quotation marks in (6) signal that something other than (e) is intended, the reasonable candidate being (f). Meanwhile (P) tells us that (e) is defeasibly intended too, though in this case there is a defeater. Because (e) entails (f), there would be no reason for using quotation marks had the speaker intended both; indeed, there is a pragmatic implication from (f) to (g), which positively contradicts (e).

(6g)  |Jack bumped into Jill in a way that resembles the fortuitous without being fortuitous|

The exact relation among (6, e, f, g) can be understood in various ways. (i) One option takes the fundamental, literal meaning of a sentence as given by principle (P). (P) tells us that (6) means (e), hence under the given scenario (6)
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is false. At the same time, because of (Q), (6) implies or otherwise conveys (g). Since speakers do sometimes deliberately make false statements for the sake of a larger conversational good, it is understandable how (6) might be false yet felicitous. (ii) An alternative option is to say that (6) generates at least two propositions, one true and one false, in effect a false conjunction. Again it is understandable how (6) might be felicitous so long as (g) is true. (iii) Perhaps, analogous to cases of ambiguity, (6) generates two propositions, where only one counts as a truth-evaluable intended reading on any given occasion. This accommodates the intuition that (6) is true. (iv) Finally, my own inclination, we might say that deciding among (i-iii) is bogus because the notion of truth is not sufficiently determinate for (6) to be either true or not.

Any one of (i-iv), if correct, promises to save my project from the apparent counter-example of (6). Moreover, so far as I can see, they are all viable. Recanati (2001: 669) effectively rejects (i, ii, iv) when he denies that (6) entails (e), but he offers no argument for doing so. Predelli (2003: 5) effectively opposes (iii) when he indicates that (6) always entails (e). His argument is that the quotation marks in (6) carry an apologetic connotation which would be inexplicable if (e) were “appropriate”, whatever that means (rationally assertable? true? polite?). But apologetic gestures can be explained on grounds other than propriety, e.g. the speaker may apologize for constructing non-customary meaning, which is costly to interpret. Moreover, there’s no reason to think that quotation marks are apologetic rather than clarificatory or something else.

In sum, loose-speech scare quotes are consistent with my overall project.

3.2 The Code-switching Account

Recanati (2001: 674) gives a different analysis. He claims that scare quotes, in at least some contexts, signal a shift in language. For example, if Jones is known to think that Goodman is Quine, and if Goodman wants to see us, I might say:

(7) Jones says that “Quine” wants to see us.

The quotation marks, signaling a shift to Jones’s idiolect, arguably make it so that my use of Quine in (7) refers to Goodman.

One problem with the language-shift hypothesis is that it works at most for cases where a deviant speaker is designated or otherwise salient. It does not apply, for instance, to (6) – where the only salient speakers are you, me, Jack, and Jill – since none of us believes that to fortuitously bump into means ‘to meet under contrivance’. If Recanati is to account for all the data, he must add
interpretive rules to those that he has. But this would be a mistake, for the quotation marks in (6) and (7) are functionally the same.

3.3 The Echoic Account

Improving on Recanati, Predelli (2003: 3) treats at least some scare quotation as echoic. For one could argue that (6) echoes Jill’s beliefs. Yet it does not strike me as plausible that the word choice in (6) must reflect someone’s thoughts in order for the quotation marks to make sense. The echoic account suffers even more when we consider other cases. For example, (8), taken by Predelli from the Chicago Manual of Style, cannot be explained as echoic.

(8) The “debate” resulted in three cracked heads.

No one says or thinks the likes of (a), let us suppose, hence the likes of (a) cannot be a source for echoing.

(8a) The event in question was literally a debate.

Nor is it reasonable to ascribe (a) to a hypothetical speaker, for if hypothetical speakers are sources of echoing then all utterance tokens are echoes, and all could legitimately carry quotation marks.

Granted, some believe that (b) is true.

(8b) The event in question was a “debate”.

However, (8) does not echo (b) on pain of infinite regress. If (8) echoes at all, it echoes the likes of (c).

(8c) The event in question resembled a debate.

But if the word choice in (8) is analogically or metaphorically evoked by (c), as my own account holds, then it is superfluous to postulate that the two are connected because an imaginary someone voices (c).

More examples of non-code-switching and non-echoic uses occur in metalinguistic citation.

4. Metalinguistic Citation

Sometimes speakers draw attention to their words in order to say something about them.⁶
(9) *Greets* is a verb.

In saying (9), according to (PQ), S defeasibly intends for us to execute (a) while attending to (b).

(9a) greets is a verb
(9b) [greets]

In executing IS A VERB (or any other predicate) at $t_2$, the audience looks left to $t_1$ for a thing-like referent to play subject. The audience finds GREETS being executed; but the execution of GREETS, far from identifying a subject, tells us to look further left for *its* subject. In short, GREETS does not “fit” IS A VERB; the execution of conceptual content (b) does not build a model.

At the same time the audience does find at $t_1$ thing-like referents, including the lexeme [greets] and the concept itself GREETS (as opposed to the result of executing the concept). In this way (9) instructs us to build the proposition [[greets is a verb] and [GREETS is a verb]]. It’s not likely that anyone would take the latter seriously, of course, because it’s obviously false; but that it could in principle be intended is illustrated by puns.

(10) *Marriage* is not a word, it’s a sentence.

Readings include that the lexeme [marriage] is a kind of clause, that [marriage] is a penalty, that the state of being married is a kind of clause, and that the state of being married is a penalty. Because the first three are obviously and categorically false while the last one is figuratively true for some (not me), the last one will normally be taken as the intended reading. It is because the first one is simultaneously an available reading, however, that (10) gets its humor.

Even without quotation marks, ostensions make expressions available for serving as referent. In some contexts the audience will be unable to decide upon the intended readings. For instance, (11, 11’) are ambiguous.

(11) Arial is elegant.
(11’) Arial is elegant.

The meanings of (11, 11’) overlap but are distinct. Setting aside scare-quote readings, the meaning of (11) encompasses, or is neutral between, an object-level reading and a meta-level reading: you may utter it to indicate either that a certain font is elegant or that a certain name is. The meaning of (11’) encompasses first- and second-order meta-level readings: you may utter it to indicate either that a certain name is elegant or that a certain way of marking
quotation is elegant, e.g. if you are debating the esthetics of apostrophes versus italics you may write (11’). In turn, (11’) overlaps with but is distinct from:

(11’’)

“Arial” is elegant.

This allows for a second-order meta-level reading, as when we are exemplifying italics, and a third-order meta-level reading, as when we are discussing the esthetics of quote-marks-within-quote-marks (should we use two apostrophe pairs, should we alternate between apostrophes and italics,…?). In sum, because any expression $x$ can be read as either used or mentioned, the meaning of $x$ overlaps in part but not whole with the meaning of $x'$, where $x'$ is just like $x$ except for one extra layer of quotation marks or one fewer. (C&L 1999a: §1-2 deny the possibility of such use-mention ambiguity, to which I reply in 2004b: §4.)

Actually (11) allows for readings of indefinitely high orders, though it does not work the other way around: (11’’) does not permit an object-level reading. My explanation for this is that association is not symmetric. In particular, in the right context a bare expression may be associated with its third-order quotation even though a third-order quotation is never associated with an object-level interpretation, all things considered. For if the object-level interpretation were intended, it would be inexplicable why the writer uses multiple layers of quotation marks.

Of course (11’) allows for an object-level interpretation when we read it as scare-quoting, and likewise (11’’) allows for a first-order reading, etc. Unfortunately, to spell out fully the interactional effects of scare-quoting and metalinguistic citing, along with the interactions of all other sorts of quotation, would demand exponentially more exposition.

5. Code-switching and Borrowings

Speakers/writers sometimes switch from one language to another in mid-discourse.

(12) Politicians are worried about la fracture sociale.

When speaker/writers wish to acknowledge or otherwise draw attention to the fact that they are code-switching, they may use marks of quotation, most typically italicization.

(12’) Politicians are worried about la fracture sociale.
Indeed, for certain terms having foreign origin, stylebooks prescribe italicizing, e.g. *au naturel*. This practice, however, is arbitrary. It reflects neither actual date of introduction into English nor degree of obscurity; it is idiosyncratic, varying from publishing house to publishing house; and it is vain, doing nothing to facilitate communication. Progressive editors reject it.

6. Mixed Discourse

Following Fauconnier (1994), I take indirect discourse reports like (13) as instructions for one to construct a “space” of propositions that is inferentially insulated from the rest of one’s cognitive system.

(13) Gerald said he would consider running for president.

I extend the theory by considering direct discourse (14) and mixed discourse (15).

(14) Gerald said, “I would consider running for president.”

(15) Gerald said he would “consider running for president”.

In saying (15), speaker S does exactly what S does in saying (13), plus a little more: S ostends instructions for building a model in which Gerald said that Gerald would consider running for president and S also pointedly ostends the words *consider running for president*. S never asserts that these words are Gerald’s. S’s statement (15) would be true even if:

(16) Gerald’s only utterance was “I’ll think about competing for the highest office”.

My claim is distinguishable from others in the literature. On the one hand, many take it that (15) both refers to the phrase *consider running for president* and predicates something of it. C&L (1999b: 211) go so far as to allege that such is “obvious”. It follows that mixed quotation and indirect quotation are inequivalent. On the other hand, Stainton (1999: 275) and Recanati (2001: 658) deny that (15) either refers to words or says anything about them and furthermore both hold that “mixed quotation is equivalent to indirect quotation – give or take some mimicry”. In the middle, I propose that in saying (15) S refers to words, but does not actually say anything of those words. I also disagree that the essential difference between mixed quotation and indirect quotation depends on the presence or absence of mimicry; indirect quotation may use exactly the same words and even same voice as the original source
and be indirect for all that. The difference is that mixed quotation signals an act of mimicry whereas indirect quotation does not.

More specifically, I deny that (15) asserts that the quoted matter represents the original speaker verbatim. My rejection of this “Verbatim Assumption”, being controversial, calls for additional positive arguments (i-ii) and rebuttals of unsound criticisms (iii-viii).\(^8\)

(i) The parity argument. It is usually admitted that (15) can be true even if Gerald’s only utterance is in Flemish. When Gerald is Flemish, the relation between his exact words and those in (15) is merely pragmatic; so by parity I argue that even when Gerald speaks English, the relation between his exact words and those in (15) is merely pragmatic. So long as the speaker has some recognizable reason for drawing attention to the very words consider running for president – for instance, if S is mocking a prior speaker’s choice of words in reporting Gerald’s speech – then S may very well say (15) without asserting or even implying that the cited words came out of Gerald. In the absence of such recognizable reasons, the implication that consider running for president were Gerald’s actual words would be the only implication available, but for all that it remains an implication.

(ii) The rarity argument. Accurate verbatim quotations are extraordinarily rare (Lehrer 1989; Clark and Gerrig 1990: §8). This means, assuming the Verbatim Assumption, that nearly all direct discourse reports are false. Yet accepting such systematic falsehood contradicts the principle of charity, which directs us to interpret statements as mostly true. Thus the empirical evidence devastates the Verbatim Assumption, at least for those who subscribe to the principle of charity as Davidsonians do.

(iii) The intuition objection. For Reimer (this volume: §1), a report like (15), under condition (16), “just sounds false”. The inference from that some would make, is that it is false, because of the Verbatim Assumption. While Reimer recognizes that intuitions of truth-conditions are unreliable, I would like to emphasize the point (cf. Saka 2004a). Consider:

\[(17) \text{In 1982 President Reagan returned from a trip to Latin America.}
\text{“Well, I learned a lot,” he told reporters. “You’d be surprised.}
\text{They’re all individual countries.” (Slansky 1989:55)}\]

What is the relation between Reagan’s utterances of (a) “Well, I learned a lot” and (b) “You’d be surprised”? For the typical subscriber of the Verbatim Assumption, (17) intuitively entails that (a) preceded (b) and did so without any intervening utterance on Reagan’s part. But no extant theory allows that such is the case. Therefore intuitions favoring the Verbatim Assumption are hardly impressive.
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(iv) The negation objection. If my claim is correct – that (15) is assertorically though not implicationally equivalent to (13) – then it would seem that (15’) should entail (13’).

(15’) Gerald didn’t say that he would “consider running for president”.
(13’) Gerald didn’t say that he would consider running for president.

Yet (15’) seems to be the narrower statement, entailed by but not entailing (13’). It relates Gerald to specific word choices whereas (13’) does not.

I could argue that, contrary to intuition, (15’) actually does entail (13’). Pragmatic implications are widely known for befogging the semantic facts, and here we simply have another case of their doing so. Evidence for this line comes from the fact that (13’”) seems to be possible.

(13’”) Gerald didn’t say that he would consider running for president, he said that he would think about competing for the highest office.

For those who hold that indirect discourse is truth-conditionally looser than quotation-marked discourse, however, (13’”) is contradictory. This again suggests that intuition is not a reliable guide to entailment relations.

More fundamentally I would argue that negation is not a truth-functional operator over propositions. Instead of asking the Platonist’s question “what does negation do?” I ask the empiricist’s question “how do speaker/hearers use negation?” I suggest, as a first approximation, that if S negates P then S denies P, and that one denies not only falsehoods but also statements deemed misleading or inadequately representative of the facts. Consequently if S says (15’), S denies (15); and to deny (15) it is sufficient for S to regard (15) as misleading rather than false.

(v) The lawyer’s objection. Surely if S testified to (15), in writing and in a legal setting, and if S did so knowing (16), and if the difference between (15) and (16) somehow spelled the difference for Gerald between conviction and exoneration, then S would be guilty of perjury. In reply, I say that judges and jurors typically care about ordinary honesty, as opposed to deception, rather than literal truth as opposed to falsehood (cf. Neisser 1981). Moreover, there are legal facts involving language that are nonetheless non-linguistic: if you sign a document, you legally bind yourself to its terms, but that does not mean that you wrote or said or even cognized what is in the document. Thus any objection to my claim based on legal practice is misconceived.

(vi) The convention objection. “If a convention establishes itself for saying P in order to imply Q, then doesn’t asserting P count as asserting Q? It is a regular, widespread, and publicly known practice to use quotation marks to
imply exact word attribution. Therefore quotation marks arguably assert exact word attribution.”

I acknowledge that quotation marks conventionally imply approximate word attribution (the professional standard in journalism is for reporters to pare down, clean up, and “correct” quotations). Furthermore, a full understanding of quotation requires understanding exactly what the conventions are and how they vary across language communities. Court recorders, for instance, commit, expect, and tolerate far more departures from the original source than scholars do, whereas practices among scholars range from the judicious to the mindlessly pedantic (e.g. preserving typographical errors while adding “[sic]”, and fretting over insignificant variation in capitalization).

However, I deny that conventional implications amount to assertions. Flagging one’s mailbox in the United States systematically implies that there is outgoing mail to be picked up; yet the flag does not assert “here is mail to be picked up”. Adding a verbal dimension hardly changes matters: saying “hello” implies friendliness, but it does not assert “I am being friendly”. For there to be assertion, there must be sufficiently rich verbal structure to represent reference and predication. Quotation marks do not have this.

(vii) The presupposition objection. Reimer (this volume: §3(a)) points out that non-assertoric content may contribute to the truth-conditions of a sentence. For instance, (18) does not assert that any eggs were green, but does entail it.

(18) I ate green eggs and ham.

Can it be that (15), though it does not assert that Gerald used certain words, nonetheless entails it?

I think not. The problem is not merely lack of assertion, it is lack of subject-predicate structure. We can say that (18) in part expresses the proposition that certain eggs were green – because, after all, it contains the one-place predicate green in appropriate juxtaposition with its subject argument eggs. In contrast we cannot say that (15) expresses the proposition that Gerald uttered certain words, for it does not contain the predicate utter. (It contains says, but says does not specifically relate to word choice, as shown by (13).) What’s more, if (15) entailed that Gerald used particular words without asserting so, (15) would presuppose that Gerald used those words, just as (18) presupposes that some eggs were green. But if Gerald did indeed use those words then (13) is true. In other words, the purported presuppositional content entails the assertoric content! This, though logically tenable, is a peculiar position to hold.

(viii) The cancellability objection. C&L (this volume: §4.3) claim that the verbatim implication of quoted discourse cannot be cancelled; to (15) you cannot consistently add, “but Gerald never used consider running for
"president". However, this view relies upon several problematic presuppositions. First, it assumes that some cancellations are linguistically self-contradictory, which cannot be if Quine is right about there being no analytic statements. (I myself do not endorse Quine on this point, but most do.)

Second, C&L assume that quotation is ambiguous, for cancellation does work if (15) is read in terms of scare quotes or echo quotes (cf. (21) below). Only by treating scare quotes and echo quotes as semantically distinct from discourse quotes can C&L begin to make their case. But positing unnecessary ambiguity is methodologically unsound. (C&L themselves deny that their distinction counts as semantic ambiguity but only by adopting an idiosyncratic view: that there is no semantic ambiguity between discourse quotes and scare quotes even though one has a semantic value that the other lacks.)

Third, C&L assume that non-cancellability is evidence of linguistically semantic content, though it’s not. When I assert P I cannot consistently cancel the implication that I believe P; yet ‘I believe P’ is not part of the content of P. When I produce my name on a contract, I may subsequently contradict myself by saying that I won’t pay, yet ‘I will pay’ is no part of the content of my name. In general, C&L are wedded to a compositional truth-conditional theory of meaning. This approach is tendentious if not untenable.

7. Direct Discourse

Direct discourse differs from mixed discourse. The biggest differences, superficially, involve quotational scope and viewpoint-shifting.

(14) Gerald said, “I would consider running for president”.
(15) Gerald said he would “consider running for president”.

In (14) the scope of quotation is the full object clause and the pronoun is interpreted according to the context of Gerald’s speech act. In (15) the scope of quotation is sub-clausal and the pronoun is interpreted according to the context of S’s speech act. These differences are far from simple and invariable, however. First, original indexicals are sometimes preserved even without quotation marking.

(19) Preachers say do as I say, not as I do. (John Selden)

Second, especially in older writing, direct discourse sometimes loses original tense.
(20) We said, “we were ready.” (the source words being *we are ready*; Francis Bacon, *New Atlantis*)

Third, quotations can take full scope even in cases that I regard as non-direct.

(21) Lucian Freud seems to attest that “Here I stand, I can do no other.” (*New Statesman & Society*, September 17, 1993, p. 33)

The fact that Lucian Freud is a painter not a writer, the word choice *attest* instead of *say*, and the use of *seems to* all work to suggest that Lucian Freud did not utter the quoted matter but rather expressed a sentiment that can be reported thereby. The report is quote-marked both because it shifts viewpoint and because it echoes or alludes to Martin Luther’s famous line.

One reason for denying that (21) is a case of direct discourse is that it has a complementizer. To indirect and mixed discourse (13, 15), *that* can equally appear or not, whereas adding *that* to (14) would change its deep syntax. This suggests to me that quoted matter in direct discourse, but not in mixed or indirect, functions as direct object. In saying (14), S draws attention first to (a) and then to (b, c).

(14a) GERALD SAID
(14b) I WOULD CONSIDER RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT
(14c) [[I] [would] [consider] [running] [for] [president]]
(14d) |Gerald said [[I] [would] [consider] [running] [for] [president]]|

In (a), SAID looks rightwards for instructions on identifying a direct object and finds (b, c). (b) directs the building of a proposition rather than an object; in a word, the concepts in (a, b) do not fit together. However, (a) fits together with (c) to form (d). Given that (c) requires GERALD SAID in order to make a well-formed model, perhaps it is not surprising that its viewpoint preferentially indexes that of Gerald.

In contrast, in saying (15) S ostends (a-d):

(15a) GERALD SAID
(15b) THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT
(15c) [[consider] [running] [for] [president]]
(15d) GERALD SAID THAT HE WOULD

Regardless of whether *that* is overtly uttered, it appears at the level of interpretation (one of the few covert elements widely accepted across syntactic schools). It combines with the subordinate conceptual content in (b) to form a direct object, thus making (a) fit with (b). The interpreter executes (a-b) as part
of (15)’s meaning and, recognizing that (c) does not feed into (d), imaginatively seeks some other point or significance in S’s ostending (c). Knowing the conventions of utterance attribution, the interpreter may assume that (c) was ostended for the sake of implying utterance attribution, but the interpreter will also know that, given the right context, S may have had a different motivation for quotation-marking, such as alluding to someone’s famous words.

In summary, differences between mixed and direct quotation naturally fall out of the fact that verbs of saying take as argument direct objects (ordinary noun phrases and that-clauses) instead of sentences, as e.g. conjunction does. Mixed and direct discourse reports do not include fundamentally separate kinds of quotation.

In rejecting the Verbatim Assumption earlier, my account belongs to the family of Stainton, Recanati, and Predelli. There are differences, however. For one thing, I uniformly reject the Verbatim Assumption for all quotation whereas the others appear to allow it for direct discourse. For another, Recanati and Predelli call implications “content”, that which is contained, as if they were in the expression, and Predelli speaks of their being “stored” (2003: 23). It seems that such exposition takes back with one hand what Recanati and Predelli give with the other, namely that expressions do not fully determine readings and that readings are constructed, not selected.

Recanati and Predelli both compare the difference between indirect discourse and mixed discourse to that between and-conjunctions and but-conjunctions. The idea is that (13) and (15) are truth-conditionally equivalent, but (15) additionally conveys a conventional implicature. In Recanati’s terminology, (15) has “use conditions” that are “fleshed out”; in Predelli’s terminology (15) “triggers attached content”. I believe that they should go further. As mentioned, it is not just mixed discourse that is assertorically equivalent to indirect discourse, it is direct discourse too. Moreover, non-truth-conditional content must be invoked not only for mixed discourse but for all constructions.

At the same time, the Recanati-Predelli thesis goes too far. The difference between but and and is entirely conventional; it must be learned. In contrast, the difference between (15) and (13) is partly natural. Suppose that you never before saw quotation marks, and then you read (15). “What are these funny marks?” you wonder. You wouldn’t be sure, but your attention would in fact be drawn to the quoted matter inside, and it should occur to you that the writer intended this effect. You would, in short, entertain as hypothesis the mentioning function of quotation marks. Indeed, the first time I saw double angles used as quotation marks, I recognized their intended function. This was facilitated yet not determined by their similarity to apostrophe pairs.
8. Titles and Other Conventions

Although quotation marks possess a naturally discernible function in some contexts, I acknowledge that there are conventional aspects too (keeping in mind that the existence or absence of convention is not a binary affair; conventions are based on mutual expectations, and expectations vary according to circumstances and come in degrees of strength). First, the combination of quotation marks with other punctuation marks traditionally follows peculiar rules. In prescribing (22) over (22'), conservatives inexplicably separate, by comma, verb from direct object; they undermine the display aspect of quotation; and they are opposed by progressives like Pullum (1991).

(22) It takes three keystrokes to type, “yes.”
(22’) It takes three keystrokes to type “yes”.

Second, iterated quotation usually switches back and forth between double apostrophes and single. Third, quotation marks do not always come in pairs. If a character’s speech is reported in two paragraphs, there will be an open-quotation mark for each and only one close-quotation mark, for a total of three. (For years I read novels thinking that the authors were making performance errors!) Fourth, different forms of quotation mark have prototypically characteristic uses – double apostrophes being used more for direct discourse and for titles of short works, italics being used more for code-switching and titles of books.

The quotational marking of titles calls for discussion. In my view, the simplest hypothesis holds that special marks on titles are marks of standard quotation, i.e. they function to signal mentioning. This view can be developed in two possible ways.

(i) According to the metalinguistic theory of names, whereby a proper name \( N \) is equivalent to the bearer of “\( N \)”, all names intrinsically involve mentioning (Tsohatzidis 2004). Given that titles are names of works, it shouldn’t be surprising that they are quotation-marked. The only surprise might be that ordinary names are not always quotation-marked, but this too can be explained by the fact that, especially in the absence of confusing ambiguity, mentioning without quotation marks is possible (Saka 2004b: §4).

(ii) When I say that I sometimes listen to Rick Derringer’s “Rock and Roll, Hoochie Koo”, I do not intend to refer to hoochie koo. (I do in fact refer to hoochie koo, but that is not my intention. I refer to hoochie koo only as an incidental side-effect of my using [hoochie koo].) When I say “Rock and Roll, Hoochie Koo”, my real intention is to refer to something associated with the name other than its customary extension. I intend, by metonym or other
association, to refer to the whole song that the words [rock and roll hoochie koo] occur in.

The phrases [rock and roll, hoochie koo], [rock and roll], and [hoochie koo] are all associated with a particular song, but only the first enjoys a privileged association, one buttressed by the quasi-linguistic convention in English (not always shared by preliterate communities) that distinguishes between official names, and nicknames and nonce names. In other words, album liners and disc jockeys, reinforced by copyright law, help to establish a salient association other than mere metonymy between designated expressions and designated works.

Other conventions used in quotation involve editorial modifications. Sherwin Nuland, in *The Mysteries Within*, writes: “The fact is that [Jan] van Helmont’s contention that the soul and mind are located in the stomach was the result of an insight gained while he was under the influence of a poison called wolfsbane…” This allows for multiple readings. I may intend for the brackets to be recognized as a form of disquotation – as markers that Jan did not appear in Nuland’s text – or I may intend to report that Nuland himself used brackets; and I may intend for the ellipses either to convey that I left something out of Nuland’s text or to represent Nuland’s own trailing off. Finally, in other texts, I may use one and the same expression either to report directly that someone used “!@#*” or to report indirectly that they used an unspecified vulgarity.

These observations are worth making partly because Simchen (1999: 331) argues that editorial modifications pose a problem for my theory. In particular he challenges me to account for

(23) Quine says that quotation has “[a]nomalous features.”

Conforming to the associationism I have emphasized, I would say that any ostension of (23) deferringly ostends first (24) and then (25): for surely when you see [a]nomalous you think ANOMALOUS.

(24) QUINE SAYS THAT QUOTATION HAS
(25) ANOMALOUS FEATURES

The quotation marks instruct us to think of something associated with the quoted matter other than its extension. We might think of (a) the form /[a]nomalous features/; given the convention of brackets, we might think of (b) the form /Anomalous features/; if ignorant of the convention, we might ignore the brackets and think of (c) /anomalous features/; and in any case we are sure to think of (d) the nearest lexemes [anomalous] [features]. Of the items just listed, (d) fits with (24) to create the most creditable reading. Therefore the reasonable interpreter concludes that, in saying (23), S intends for us to execute
(24) and to attend to (d). In addition, if we know the convention of brackets, we surmise that (d) reflects Quine’s word choice modulo the bracketed portion.

9. Conclusion

To summarize, I offer a unified account of scare quotes (including loose, pedagogical, and distancing uses), echo quotes or allusions, quotation-marked metalinguistic citation, quoted discourse reports (direct and mixed), and marked code-switching/borrowings and titles. Quotational principle (Q) tells us that quotation marks signal mentioning, that there is reference to something other than what is customary. In most cases, reference is to the quoted matter (or to some linguistic type with which it is associated); in the case of loose-speech scare quotes, reference is to something resembling the extension of the quoted matter; and in the case of titles, reference is to the product named by the quoted matter. At the same time, primary principle (P) tells us that when utterances impinge on audiences, audiences automatically attempt to execute the conventionally associated lexico-syntactic conceptual structure; quoted matter is defeasibly used as well as mentioned. The use interpretation is defeated, however, when it is ungrammatical, as in the case of most citations and titles; and when it is pragmatically contradicted by the mention interpretation, as in the case of loose-speech scare quotes. In short, standard quotation marks always direct the audience to the same panoply of material: to the concepts that are automatically associated with the quoted matter and to “something else”. It is up to the interpreter to assemble a propositional model using higher-level reasoning not specifically provided by the particular words at hand. As a result, linguistic meaning underdetermines truth-conditions.

This view extends to my treatment of mixed and direct discourse. Quotation-marked discourse, as in (14), does not in virtue of its linguistic meaning entail that the reported subject used the actual words on display. (That the subject used some words follows not from the quotation marks but from the verb say.)

(14) Gerald said, “I would consider running for president.”

If (14) is nonetheless associated with truth-conditions requiring that Gerald uttered the words quoted, then such truth-conditions are contextually constructed by creative interpretation influenced by extra-linguistic customs of the sort seen elsewhere. (In signing a contract, S may promise to pay a mortgage even though S never says or writes that S will pay the mortgage. Likewise, in using direct discourse, S might report that Gerald used specified words without saying or writing that Gerald used them.)
I have taken indirect discourse as a given, using it as a basis upon which to suggest an analysis of quoted discourse. I thus invert the explanatory order of the popular inscription theory, which understands indirect discourse as a kind of transformed quotation (e.g. Scheffler 1954). Two considerations favor my analysis of discourse over the inscriptive account. First, it enjoys architectonic support from being part of a larger theory of quotation. Second, indirect discourse seems to me to be far more frequent than direct discourse, which suggests that indirect discourse is cognitively more basic.

My treatment of discourse assumes that English has a single lexeme [say]. In contrast, for C&L (1999b) the surface verb say encompasses two predicates, ‘samesay’ and ‘sametoken’ (Saka 2004b: §7(i)). For Gómez-Torrente (this volume), English say is lexically ambiguous. C&L (this volume: §2) also posit ambiguity when they distinguish between discourse quotes and scare quotes. In short, the core of my theory of quotation (Q), supplemented by an independently motivated principle of language (P), appears to offer non-equivocational explanations for a broad variety of uses of quotation marks.

Still, my work leaves many problems unresolved. For starters, I am not happy with metaphorical appeals to concepts “fitting” together. In preliminary defense I could point out that better thinkers than I have relied on notions equally ill-defined. I might also mention that it is better to have an unfledged theory, which may or may not mature into a success, than rigorous precision that is rigorously wrong. Even so, my project does call for more elaboration.

Another problem involves zeugma such as:

(26) Socrates is a philosopher and has 8 letters.

If I can simultaneously use and mention, as I can in reporting someone’s speech, why can I not do so here? Perhaps simultaneous use and mention in reporting speech is so common that audiences are practiced in effortlessly understanding what is being communicated. In other cases, divided ostension calls for divided attention, and if you’re not used to dividing your attention in a certain way it may be discomfiting. Notice that while (26) is indeed peculiar, it is neither ungrammatical nor uninterpretable. Regardless of the explanation, it is something like

(27) This book is on the bestseller list and weighs 26 ounces.

The markedness of (27) must be explained by some principle, call it \( \pi \), independent of quotation. Whatever \( \pi \) is, it might explain (26).

Finally, if quotation marks mark mentionings, and if mentionings include irony (Jorgensen et al. 1984), then why is written irony rarely if ever quotation marked, especially given that spoken irony frequently carries special tonal
markings? And why do poetry, allusions, and wordplay often go without quotation marks? Speakers surely wish to draw attention to word choice in their deliberate rhymes and puns. If quotation marks serve to draw attention to word choice, why then do they not use quotation marks? In the rhymes of spontaneous speech, perhaps speakers do not use quotation marks because quotation marks are rarely used in speech at all; in writing, perhaps poets do not use quotation marks because it goes without saying that literary appreciation requires attending to form, content, and the relation between them. (Indeed, even many essayists and novelists choose their words with such care that they want the word choice to be noticed.) Perhaps written literature is a game that readers do not want given away.¹⁰

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Notes
1 A distinct kind of quotation appears in No “shirts”, no “service”. Such quotation not only violates standard norms – it typically occurs in writing that does not enjoy the benefit of professional editing – it also seems to have nothing to do with signaling mentioning. Still, as Abbott (this volume: §4.2) emphasizes, it must be explained by any comprehensive theory of language.
2 Technical distinctions could be drawn among reference, denotation, extension, and so on. In this paper, however, such terms are used not only loosely (so as to accommodate the cognitivism set forth in §1) but also broadly and interchangeably.
3 Certain other objections to intentionalism, though widespread, are non-starters (cf Bach 1992, García-Carpintero, this volume: §1). By the way, it’s worth noting that Lewis Carroll sided with Humpty Dumpty’s first doctrine (cf. Gardner 1960: 269) – the position is not manifestly absurd, nor can it be ruled out by fiat or by tendentious definitions of semantics.
4 Simchen (1999: 331) attributes to me the thesis that “quotation signals the exclusion of one aspect of the ordinary use of expressions – the extension”. My actual words were: “quote marks generally [i.e. typically, not universally]… rule out customary reference as the intended interpretation. Thus, the speaker who uses quote marks announces ‘I am not (merely) using expression x but am mentioning it’ ” (1998: 127, italicization added; point elaborated on p. 115, implied on p. 126, and stressed on p. 133). My claim then as now is that quotation marks signal mentioning, and that mentioning is compatible with using.
5 To use Recanati’s terminology (2001: 669), (4) and (6) are cumulative and non-cumulative. The colloquial strict speech and loose speech have precedence, however.
6 Recanati (2001) calls (9) a case of flat mention and of closed quotation, the latter being a metaphor that I find opaque. I would rather speak of pure[ly referential] quotation, as C&L (1999a) do, or of citations, as linguists do.
7 The disagreement is rooted in one’s understanding of reference. Because “consider running for president” can be predicated, I argue that it refers (§2ii).
C&L (this volume: note 17), believe that they avoid commitment to the Verbatim Assumption because they appeal to unconstrained notions of “same-saying” and “same-tokening”. But their position allows same-tokening to be coextensive with, or even broader than, same-saying: indirect discourse reports would absurdly entail the corresponding direct discourse. Related criticisms have been registered by Tsohatzidis (1998), Elugardo (1999), Stainton (1999), Saka (this volume: §7(i)), and Reimer (this volume: note 16).

Gómez-Torrente (contribution to this volume: §ii), admitting that there are apparent examples of cancellability, correctly notes that they “cannot convince someone who does not accept that all uses of the quotation marks have the same meaning.” However, this does not put the two sides of the issue on an even par. For the assumption of ambiguity carries the burden of proof; univocality is the default assumption.

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