



**TECHNISCHE
UNIVERSITÄT
DRESDEN**

Faculty of Computer Science Institute of Systems Architecture, Operating Systems Group

RUNNING THE WORLD'S CODE FROM DRESDEN

MICHAEL ROITZSCH



Professur Betriebssysteme




Barkhausen-Institut

Systems Software Research is Irrelevant


Rob Pike (damals Bell Labs, heute Google)

2000

- Publication Count
- Citation Count
- H-Index







**Funktionsfähige Systeme, die ein Problem
mit praktischer Relevanz lösen.**

Applikation

Applikation

Betriebssystem

Hardware

Applikation

Applikation

Dateisystem

TCP/IP-Stack

Gerätetreiber

Speicherverwaltung

Betriebssystem

Hardware

Applikation

Applikation

Dateisystem


TCP/IP-Stack


Gerätetreiber


Speicherverwaltung


L4-Mikrokern


Hardware














- **Trusted Computing Base (TCB):** Menge an Komponenten, denen eine Anwendung für das Erbringen ihrer Funktionalität vertrauen muss
- abhängig von Anwendung und Funktionalität
- Mikrokerne ermöglichen minimale, anwendungsspezifische TCBs

Mikrokerne helfen, wachsende Komplexität von Systemen durch Zerlegung beherrschbar zu machen.

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ARM

Intel


TPU

NVM

5G




Plattform für IoT





Plattform für IoT



fTPM: A Software-only Implementation of a TPM Chip

Himanshu Raj, Stefan Saroiu, Alec Wolman, Ronald Aigner, Jeremiah Cox,
Paul England, Chris Fenner, Kinshuman Kinshumann, Jork Loeser, Dennis Mattoon,
Magnus Nystrom, David Robinson, Rob Spiger, Stefan Thom, and David Wooten
Microsoft*

Abstract: *Commodity CPU architectures, such as ARM and Intel CPUs, have started to offer trusted computing features in their CPUs aimed at displacing dedicated trusted hardware. Unfortunately, these CPU architectures raise serious challenges to building trusted systems because they omit providing secure resources outside the CPU perimeter.*


This paper shows how to overcome these challenges to build software systems with security guarantees similar to those of dedicated trusted hardware. We present the design and implementation of a firmware-based TPM 2.0 (fTPM) leveraging ARM TrustZone. Our fTPM is the reference implementation of a TPM 2.0 used in millions of mobile devices. We also describe a set of mechanisms needed for the fTPM that can be useful for building more sophisticated trusted applications beyond just a TPM.

Secure Enclave


The Secure Enclave is a coprocessor fabricated within the system on chip (SoC). It uses encrypted memory and includes a hardware random number generator. The Secure Enclave provides all cryptographic operations for **Data Protection** key management and maintains the integrity of Data Protection even if the kernel has been compromised. Communication between the Secure Enclave and the application processor is isolated to an interrupt-driven mailbox and shared memory data buffers.

The Secure Enclave includes a dedicated Secure Enclave Boot ROM. Similar to the application processor Boot ROM, the Secure Enclave Boot ROM is immutable code that establishes the hardware root of trust for the Secure Enclave.

The Secure Enclave runs a Secure Enclave OS based on an Apple-customized version of the L4 microkernel. This Secure Enclave OS is signed by Apple, verified by the Secure Enclave Boot ROM, and updated through a personalized software update process.



CYBERUS TECHNOLOGY



CYBERUS TECHNOLOGY

Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space

Moritz Lipp¹, Michael Schwarz¹, Daniel Gruss¹, Thomas Prescher²,
Werner Haas², Anders Fogh³, Jann Horn⁴, Stefan Mangard¹,

Paul Kocher⁵, Daniel Genkin^{6,9}, Yuval Yarom⁷, Mike Hamburg⁸

¹Graz University of Technology, ²Cyberus Technology GmbH,

³G-Data Advanced Analytics, ⁴Google Project Zero,

⁵Independent (www.paulkocher.com), ⁶University of Michigan,

⁷University of Adelaide & Data61, ⁸Rambus, Cryptography Research Division

CYBERUS TECHNOLOGY

LazyFP: Leaking FPU Register State using Microarchitectural Side-Channels

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- Arbeit an „echten“ Systemen
- enge Zusammenarbeit mit Mitarbeitern der Professur
- vielseitige Firmen- und Forschungs-Landschaft

Systems Research: More Relevant than Ever.