



# Security and Cryptography 1

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*Module 4: Basic Crypto, Stream Ciphers*

*Disclaimer: Günter Schäfer, Mark Manulis, large parts from Dan Boneh*

Dresden, WS 16/17

You know *threats, security goals (CIA!)* and *security services*

You know *adversary models* and which aspects they define

You know some historical ciphers and how they were broken (basic cryptanalysis)

You have already heard of the one-time pad and perfect secrecy

And you know some basics of discrete probability (specifically the beauty of XOR)

Some crypto background

Kerckhoff's principle

More detailed attacker models

Introduction to stream ciphers

Pseudo random generators

Semantic security (vs. Information theoretic security)

Semantic security of stream ciphers

## Recall CIA:

- **Confidentiality:** only authorized access to information
- **Integrity:** detection of message modification
- **Availability:** services are live and work correctly

## Where crypto can (trivially) help:

- **Confidentiality:** Encryption transforms plaintext to conceal it
  - Symmetric crypto (single key)
  - Asymmetric crypto (key-pair)
- **Integrity**
  - Message authentication / signing of data with authenticated digest (cryptographic hash/signature)

## Type of operation


- Substitution
- Transposition

## Number of keys

- Symmetric: secret key
- Asymmetric: „public key“, pair of public and private key

## Processing of plaintext

- Stream ciphers: operate on streams of bits
- Block ciphers: operate on b-bit blocks



*“The cipher method must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience.”*


i.o.w: KGen, E, and D will inevitably be discovered at some stage

→ All algorithms should be public

→ security must rely on secrecy of the key only


## ***Ciphertext-only attack:***

- despite concealed key
- using ciphertext only
- learn about plaintext (or key)



## ***Known-plaintext attack:***


- despite concealed key
- Knowing some plaintexts
- Learn about plaintext (or key)



- ***Represents weakest attacker!***


## *Chosen-plaintext attack:*

- despite concealed key
- asking Alice to encrypt  $m_a$
- learn about  $m_j$  (or key)



## *Chosen-ciphertext attack:*

- despite concealed key
- asking Bob to decrypt  $c_a$
- learn about  $m_j$  (or key)



*Strongest attacker!*



Recall a symmetric cipher over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$

is a pair of efficient algorithms  $(E, D)$  where

$$E: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \quad \text{and} \quad D: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$$

such that  $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, k \in \mathcal{K} : D(k, E(k, m)) = m$

Where for the OTP:

$$\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$c := E(k, m) = m \oplus k \quad \text{and} \quad D(k, m) = c \oplus k$$

msg:	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	$\oplus$
key:	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	
CT:									

$$D(k, E(k, m)) =$$

*Can you compute the key given  $m$  and  $c$ ? How?*

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<hr/>									
CT:									

$$D(k, E(k, m)) = D(k, (m \oplus k)) = k \oplus (m \oplus k) = (k \oplus k) \oplus m = 0 \oplus m = m$$



*Can you compute the key given  $m$  and  $c$ ? How?*

*So is the one time pad secure?*

*What does „secure“ mean, in the first place?*

Let's assume a CT-only attacker, what is a good requirement?

- *Attacker cannot recover the secret key*
  - „ $E(k, m) = m$ “ !
- *Attacker cannot recover the complete plaintext*
  - „ $E(k, m_0 | m_1) = m_0 | k \oplus m_1$ “!



Shannon (1949):

„CT should not reveal *any* information about PT“

Def: A cipher (E,D) over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$  has *perfect secrecy* if

$\forall m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$  ( with  $\text{len}(m_0) = \text{len}(m_1)$  )  
 $\forall c \in \mathcal{C}$  and  $k \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{K}$ :

$$\Pr[E(k, m_0) = c] = \Pr[E(k, m_1) = c]$$

*So being an attacker, what do I learn?*

No CT attack can tell if msg is  $m_0, m_1$  (or any other message)

→ No CT only attacks

# Recall: The One-Time-Pad (Vernam cipher)

Truly random key, as long as the message:

$m =$ 

A	T	T	A	C	K	T	H	E	C	I	T	Y	A	T	T	W	E	L	V	E
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

  
 $k =$ 

P	S	P	I	U	H	G	D	S	P	H	G	D	S	P	I	W	E	E	W	O
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

(+ mod 26)

$c =$ 

P	L	I	I	W	R	Z	K	W	R	P	Z	B	S	I	B	S	I	P	R	S
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

$k =$ 

Y	H	P	R	S	R	G	F	F	D	D	X	N	S	Q	I	S	P	W	N	F
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

  
 $m =$ 

R	E	T	R	E	A	T	F	R	O	M	C	O	A	S	T	A	T	T	E	N
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

(+ mod 26)

... or any other message of the same length, for that matter

*Now, what are the two problems with this method?*

Suppose:  $\forall m, c: \Pr_k[E(k, m) = c] = \frac{\#\text{keys } k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ s.t. } E(k, m) = c}{|\mathcal{K}|}$

Now, if:  $\forall m, c \#\{k \in \mathcal{K} : E(k, m) = c\}$  is constant

Then: cipher has perfect secrecy



*(no matter of  $m, c$ : probability is always the same!)*

**For OTP:**  $c = m \oplus k$  so  $k = m \oplus c$   
 $\#\{k \in \mathcal{K} : E(k, m) = c\} = 1$

→ One Time Pad has perfect secrecy

Len(m) ≤ Len(k)...  
So how do we make it practical?

OTP:




Idea: replace random by „pseudorandom“ key

PRNG is a function  $G: \{0,1\}^s \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$        $n \gg s$

Det. algorithm from seed space to key space (looking random)

$$C := E(k, m) = m \oplus G(k)$$

$$D(k, c) = c \oplus G(k)$$



*Can this achieve perfect secrecy?*


So, how „secure“ is it then?



What does „PRNG is predictable “ mean?

Suppose  $\exists i: G(k) |_{1,\dots,i} \xrightarrow{\text{alg.}} G(k) |_{i+1,\dots,n}$

Then:



We call a PRNG  $(G: K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n)$  **predictable**, if:


$\exists$  efficient algorithm  $A$  and  $\exists 0 \leq i \leq n - 1$  such that

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}} [A(G(k) |_{1,\dots,i}) = G(k) |_{i+1}] > \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \quad (\text{for non-negl. } \epsilon)$$

PRNG is **unpredictable**:  $\forall i$ : no adv. can predict bit  $(i+1)$  for n.n.  $\epsilon$

Terminal goal: make PRNG indistinguishable from RNG (OTP)

Let  $G: K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  be a PRNG



So what does it mean that:

$$[k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}, \text{output } G(k)]$$

is „indistinguishable“ from:

$$[r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n, \text{output } r]$$

Let's define statistical tests:

Let algorithm  $A : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

denote: „0“:  $A(x)$  not random, and „1“:  $A(x)$  may be random

Numerous evidence possible:

- No. of occurrences of „0“ vs. „1“
- No. of occurrences of „00“
- Length of longest sequence of „0“
- ...

Let  $G: K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  be a PRNG and

$A$  a statistical test on  $\{0,1\}^n$


Then:

$$\text{Adv}_{PRG}[A, G] =$$

$$|\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}}[A(G(k)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[A(r) = 1]| \in [0,1]$$

A cannot distinguish  $\rightarrow$  Adv close to 

A can distinguish  $\rightarrow$  Adv close to 1

A silly example:  $A(x) = 0 \Rightarrow \text{Adv}_{PRG}[A, G] =$  

Let  $G: K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  be a PRNG and  
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A cannot distinguish  $\rightarrow$  Adv close to 0

A can distinguish  $\rightarrow$  Adv close to 1

A silly example:  $A(x) = 0 \Rightarrow \text{Adv}_{PRG}[A, G] = 0$

Def: We say that  $G:K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  is a **secure PRNG** if  
 $\forall$  “efficient” statistical tests A:

$$Adv_{PRG}[A, G] \text{ is “negligible”}$$

In other words: A secure PRNG is **unpredictable**

**More generally:**

Let  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  be two distributions over  $\{0,1\}^n$

Def: We say that  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are

**computationally indistinguishable** (denoted  $P_1 \approx_p P_2$ )

iff  $\forall$  “efficient” statistical tests A:

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow P_1}[A(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow P_2}[A(x) = 1] \right| < \textit{negligible}$$

Recall Shannons perfect secrecy:

(E,D) has perfect secrecy, if  $\forall m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M} (|m_0|=|m_1|)$

$$\{E(k, m_0)\} = \{E(k, m_1)\} \text{ where } k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}$$

Let's say instead:


(E,D) has „some“ secrecy, if  $\forall m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M} (|m_0|=|m_1|)$

$$\{E(k, m_0)\} \approx_p \{E(k, m_1)\} \text{ where } k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}$$

under given  $m_0$  and  $m_1$

Let's play a game:

A challenger flips a coin, and the adversary guesses the outcome  
For  $b=0,1$  define experiments  $\text{EXP}(0)$  and  $\text{EXP}(1)$  as:



for  $b=0,1$ :  $W_b := [ \text{event that } \text{EXP}(b) = 1 ]$


$$\text{Adv}_{SS}[A, E] := |\Pr[W_0] - \Pr[W_1]| \in [0,1]$$

Again:

$E$  is called **semantically secure** if for all eff.  $A$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{SS}[A, E]$  is negligible




# OTP is semantically secure



For all A:  $\text{Adv}_{\text{SS}}[A, \text{OTP}] = \left| \Pr[ A(k \oplus m_0) = 1 ] - \Pr[ A(k \oplus m_1) = 1 ] \right|$

# OTP is semantically secure




For all A:  $\text{Adv}_{\text{SS}}[A, \text{OTP}] = \left| \Pr[ A(k \oplus m_0) = 1 ] - \Pr[ A(k \oplus m_1) = 1 ] \right| = 0$

# So, are stream ciphers semantically secure?

We have shown:

- Unpredictable PRNG are secure
- OTP (XOR with truly random bitstring) is secure

Proof intuition:



The **two** time pad:

Assume you use a stream cipher **key** more than once:

$$c_1 = m_1 \oplus \text{PRNG}(k)$$

$$c_2 = m_2 \oplus \text{PRNG}(k)$$

*How can this be attacked?*


$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (m_1 \oplus \text{PRNG}(k)) \oplus (m_2 \oplus \text{PRNG}(k)) = 0 \oplus m_1 \oplus m_2$$

ASCII and natural language highly redundant and regular,


deriving  $m_1, m_2$  from  $m_1 \oplus m_2$  is easy...

Examples are plentiful:

- Project Venona
- MS-PPTP (Win NT: two streams of messages enc with same key)
  - Lesson learned: use separate key per direction!
- WEP (802.11b)
  - $PRG(IV||k)$  to avoid identical keys ( $k$ =long time key)
  - IV 24 bits and commonly reset to 0 after power cycle
  - After each cycle ( $2^{24} \approx 16M$ ) again a two time pad
- Disk encryption:



Assuming a similar example as before:



In this simple example:

Bob = 42 6F 62; Eve = 45 76 65; Bob  $\oplus$  Eve = 07 19 07 ( $p := 0000071907$ )

**Lesson: Modification is undetected and has predictable impact!**

You know the different classes of encryption algorithms

You remember Kerckhoff's principle

You've seen four different adversary models

You can prove that the One Time Pad has perfect secrecy

You've been introduced to the idea of stream ciphers

You understand why PRNG have to be unpredictable

You will avoid Two Time Pads and recall Malleability

You know semantic security and that stream ciphers are semantically secure