A Tale of Two Worlds?
U.S. Hegemony and Regional Development:
The Case of Latin America

Jakob Lempp and Stefan Robel
Abstract

In mainstream theoretical debates on development in Southern parts of the globe U.S. hegemony has been either outright neglected (e.g. Modernisation theories) or singled out as the central structural factor to account for the continuation of underdevelopment (Dependencia theories; some strands of World System theory). These assumptions, incompatible as they are, are at odds with one central claim of the debate on Hegemonic Stability theory, namely, that U.S. global hegemony is largely responsible for the accelerating economic development of Western European and East Asian countries (above all: Japan) after World War II.

In this paper the authors combine insights from International Relations theory and Comparative Politics analysis by using an analytical definition of international hegemony circumscribing interstate, transnational and domestic/societal factors. Hereby they develop hypotheses on the diverse effects of U.S. hegemony on Latin American development. The basic claim of Hegemonic Stability theory, namely, that the existence of a Hegemonic power plays a crucial part in the development of states and societies in its sphere of influence, is confronted with broad empirical data of Latin American development.

Our findings are that U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere both coincides with relative peacefulness of interstate relations as well as societal upheaval within states in Latin America. Our hypothesis is that U.S. hegemony in Latin America provides both for interstate stability and inner state/societal instability. The latter deviation – compared to Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century – can be explained by the different character of U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere, which generally encompasses the consent of elites but not that of the broad public in Latin American societies. Given that the absence of interstate wars in itself promotes development and the presence of domestic instability hinders development, our final hypothesis is that U.S. hegemony has at best an ambivalent impact on development in the region.
Contents

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

2. International Hegemony and International Relations: Towards a Systemic Analysis? ................................................................................................................. 2

2.1. The “Theory” of Hegemonic Stability .............................................................. 4

2.2. Central Deficits of Systemic Theories of Hegemony ......................................... 6

3. The Case of Latin America: Characteristics of a Region ......................................... 8

4. Towards a Society-oriented Model of International Hegemony ............................ 10

4.1. Definition and Different Spheres of Influence of Hegemony ......................... 11

4.2. Core Components of a Society-oriented Analysis of International Hegemony ............................................................ 14

5. Application of the New Hegemonic Model to the Case of Latin America ............ 16

6. Consequences of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America .............................................. 19

7. Conclusion: U.S. Hegemony and Development in Latin America: Ambivalence and Ambiguousness ................................................................. 22

Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 24

Appendices.................................................................................................................. 33
A Tale of Two Worlds? U.S. Hegemony and Regional Development: The Case of Latin America*

Jakob Lempp and Stefan Robel

The whole hemisphere will be ours in fact as (...) it already is ours morally.\(^1\)

The absence of interstate conflict in the region, due in part to U.S. hegemony (...) made Latin America relatively peaceful.\(^2\)

Latin America is a graveyard for failed development theories.\(^3\)

1. Introduction

A spectre is haunting Latin America – the spectre of leftist governments! Luiz “Lula” da Silva in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabaré Vásquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Rafael Correa Delgado in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua; and almost Otón Solís in Costa Rica, Violeta Menjívar in El Salvador and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico. Latin America is increasingly governed by left-wing governments and presidents, who explicitly reject any notion of U.S. hegemony in the region. Their popular claim sharply contradicts the normative base line of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS): Hegemony is not seen as a boon to Latin America, granting security and stability to the region, but a method of exploitation.\(^4\)

* Revised and updated version of a paper prepared for the 47th Annual International Studies Association Convention “The North-South Divide and International Studies”, San Diego/Ca., March 22-25, 2006. This paper is a work of collaboration. However, the theoretical model of society-oriented hegemony referred to here has been developed by Stefan Robel. The authors wish to thank Charlotte Daub, Janko Altenschmidt and Sunshine Moore for their valuable support in translating the text from German into English language. Almut Meyer zu Schwabedissen and Daniel Ristau read the manuscript and freed it of many flaws. The remaining errors are ours alone.

4 Most of these candidates have campaigned on an explicitly anti-American platform and it can be argued that this was in most cases instrumental in bringing them into government.
In any case, it is not only an academic truism that U.S. hegemony has played a major role in Latin America in general and in Latin American development in particular. However, the effect of U.S. hegemony on development in Latin America has yet escaped any thorough, systematic analysis. Some grand theories of development, particularly Dependencia theory and World-Systems-Analysis, dominated the theoretical debate for some time positing that the U.S.-American hegemony was central in inhibiting development in Latin America. This hypothesis radically contradicts a central argument of THS, namely that U.S. hegemony enables or promotes development. Along these lines THS identified U.S. hegemony as the major cause for the catching-up process of economic growth and development in Western Europe and Japan after World War II.

In this paper we do not attempt to describe historiographically the emergence and evolution of the debate in development studies. We rather try to adjust at least some basic elements of classical THS to fit the current situation in Latin America. Therefore we will first give a brief overview of classical THS, then apply this model to Latin America and identify necessary theoretical modifications. Finally, drawing upon the modified theoretical framework of THS we will argue that U.S. hegemony has had an ambivalent effect on development in Latin America, on the one hand fostering inter-state stability while, at the same time, contributing to intra-state instability.

2. International Hegemony and International Relations: Towards a Systemic Analysis?

The war on Iraq, the crisis of transatlantic relations, the arrival of the “conservative revolution” of the 1990s in the American executive with the election of George W. Bush, the change in U.S. security policy since 9/11: All these developments have brought the global dominance of the United States of America back into the focus of the media as well as of academic discussion. American hegemony has again become a catchword all around the globe. American hegemony? Not exactly so! Terms such as “last remaining superpower”, “hyper power” or “American empire” compete for semantic authority over the special status of the USA within the international system. This phenomenon, although being debated on and off since the end of World War II,
has been interpreted quite differently over time. As the ideological-intellectual veil of the Cold War is being lifted in the field of foreign policy analysis, international relations theories still fail to deliver a sophisticated theoretical concept of international hegemony, even more so a concept that can be applied successfully in empirical analysis. Even a theoretical debate on this subject is still in a somewhat nascent state. Increasingly criticism is voiced pointing to this desideratum: Pressurised by the current development of world politics, political scientists must fill the analytical blank and provide analytical substance to the concept of hegemony.

It is remarkable that the at times highly fashionable term “hegemony” had temporarily almost eluded the mainstream discussion on Latin American (under-) development. “Imperialism” and “Dependency” were dominant explanatory concepts until the end of the 1970s. From the 1980s onwards these terms were substituted by a discourse that more or less entirely avoided the concept of power. It negated external factors of underdevelopment and thus focused almost exclusively on internal variables to explain development or, moreover, the lack of it. As it is the discipline of IR which claims to deliver the theoretical basic research of international relations, who, if not international relations theorists, should redress the aforementioned shortcomings?

Furthermore: We should take U.S. hegemony as what the concept implies to be, namely: A global phenomenon. If so, approaches that are merely concerned with its effects on certain regions of the world are highly questionable. Conversely, systemic neo-Marxian theories must necessarily overlook regional and national differences and have encountered severe criticism on this issue.

As the study of international relations certainly comprises development research, it is this angle, from which we want to approach the role of U.S.-American hegemony. More specifically, in this paper we aim at taking a first thorough step towards uniting the so far strangely divided worlds of development studies and hegemonic theories of IR. We shall try to do so in a comprehensive, but still differentiated approach. It will combine the central hypothesis of hegemonic stability theory with its application on

---

5 The concept of hegemony started re-emerging in the second half of the 1990s in foreign policy analysis, see Czempiel 1996. On the at times striking differences in analytical treatment of the role of the United States within foreign policy analysis on the one hand and IR theory on the other, see Robel 1999.

6 This conclusion might be debatable. From the point of view of seeing a theoretical debate on the concept of hegemony as a desideratum, this verdict is hardly contestable.

7 Cf. Menzel 1991; see also the reply by Lothar Brock (1992a).
and confrontation with some empirical data of broad macroeconomic, political and social developments in Latin America.

2.1 The “Theory” of Hegemonic Stability

Which instruments have been used in the discipline of International Relations to systematically analyse international hegemonic relations? Arguably, the debate on the “Theory of Hegemonic Stability” (THS) of the 1980s delivered the major tool box for a comprehensive theoretical understanding of international hegemony within mainstream IR theory. In what follows we will sketch out the basic lines of argument, results and deficits of the debate.\(^8\)

Within the THS the U.S.-American IR community analysed the conditions for the emersion and continuity of interstate, economic cooperation. THS theorists agreed on the assumption that institutionalised cooperation among states, portrayed as rational egoists, can only occur in the presence of a dominant, leading state.

In the early 1970s, the economist Charles P. Kindleberger laid the foundations for the “theory” with his economic-historical treatise “The World in Depression, 1929 – 1939”.\(^9\) Kindleberger argued that the economic downturn of the 1920s could only develop into a worldwide economic crisis, because Great Britain had ceased to be able and the USA was not yet willing to guarantee the stability of the international economic system. Kindleberger writes: “For the world economy to be stabilized there must be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.”\(^10\) The main thesis is: Without a hegemon, a dominant state that is able and willing to exert leadership, order in the international system cannot be maintained. “Public goods” such as the gradual reduction of barriers to trade would not be provided.

The following three basic theses of Kindleberger already comprise fundamental components of the THS:

---

\(^8\) For a concise summary of this multifarious debate, see Robel 2001, for a more detailed overview, see Robel 1994.

\(^9\) Kindleberger 1986. For this common assessment of Kindleberger’s role see, for instance, O’Brien/Pigman 1992, 89.

\(^10\) Kindleberger 1986, 304.
(1) the conception of international order as a public good;

(2) the direct connection between the decrease of international order and the decline of the hegemon;

(3) the inference that hegemonic systems can easily dissolve into instability.

In contrast to what its name suggests, the Theory of Hegemonic Stability has rather been a theoretical debate than a genuine theory. Representatives of different schools of thought made sense of Kindleberger’s general assumptions within their theoretical paradigms, thereby devising different variants of THS. It has been Robert Gilpin, among others, who posited that “enlightened self interest” motivated the hegemon’s “willingness to maintain order”, not altruism as Kindleberger had seemed to assume. The fact that hegemonic order temporarily benefits all is thus secondary to the hegemon. Redefining the motivation of the hegemonic state opens the way for a more differentiated assessment of hegemonic actions. The Realist Stephen Krasner furthered the argument when he advocated a distinction between “benign” and “predatory hegemony”.

Robert Keohane made an important contribution from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism, when positing that order after hegemony could be maintained without a dominant state. He argued that a hegemon was necessary for the creation of functioning global and regional institutions, but international regimes and institutions, once in place, could perpetuate and even further develop cooperation independent of a hegemon.

The contribution of the American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein breaks with the mainstream strands of THS in several ways: Firstly, he identifies the current form of the world system with the world market rather than a system of states and therefore takes the market as his central analytical category. Secondly, in contrast to the OECD-centred perspective of most participants in the debate, he poses different, no less important questions: What are the reasons for “underdevelopment” in most parts of the

---

14 See Krasner 1991a+b.
world? What part does hegemonic relations play in general and U.S. hegemony in particular?\footnote{Cf. Wallerstein 1991.}

Still, Wallerstein’s highly original contribution, just like the other variants of THS, fails to deliver a heuristically abstract and at the same time empirically applicable conceptualisation of the role of the hegemonic state, the United States of America, in current international relations. This comes as no surprise, as Wallerstein – other than his more mainstream contenders – did not intend to do this. In that respect, “The World System version of THS” is much closer to the mainstream and its deficits. This holds especially true if we look at the fact that Wallerstein, albeit implicitly, agrees with IR theorists as Keohane when claiming that the hegemony of the United States has ended during the 1970s.\footnote{For further parallels see the analysis in Robel 1994, 102-116.}

\subsection*{2.2. Central Deficits of Systemic Theories of Hegemony}

In order to fill this blank, it is necessary to recognise, why it came about in the first place. The central deficits of the above sketched theoretical debate of the 1980s can be summed up as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(1.)] \textit{The economisation and trivialisation of the concept of power and the myth of U.S.-American hegemonic decline}
\end{itemize}

THS theorists regarded interstate hegemony as a purely economic phenomenon.\footnote{Cultural factors were hardly considered in IR reasoning before the so-called “Constructivist turn”, but even military factors were largely neglected within the debate on Hegemonic Stability as analysts nearly exclusively focussed on economic indicators (THS can be truly seen as the cradle of modern IPE in the U.S.). Susan Strange, herself an early critic of THS, on the contrary identifies four power structures (security, production, financial and knowledge structures), in which the hegemonic state has to dominate (at least in the majority of them) to be rightfully dubbed hegemonic. On this basis, qualifying the one sided view point of the THS, she criticises the “myth of lost hegemony” (Strange 1987). On the mechanisms of the “rise of American decline” see also Harries 1988.} Therefore, registering a slackening in GDP growth, analysts announced the hegemonic decline of America. But this diagnosis did not even hold well in the economic sphere:

\newpage
Economic indicators of the 1980s and 1990s simply do not validate that claim.\(^{19}\) Thus, lacking any substance the diagnosis of a hegemonic decline disappeared during the 1990s as intuitively as it had come about in the first place.\(^{20}\) What remained was the dominance of the very systemic grand theories that had caused the misconception of the “rise of the American decline” in the first place (see also 3.).

(2.) The absence of a conceptualised and differentiated notion of hegemony

Even the early critics of the hegemonic decline thesis questioned the concept of hegemony underlying the THS and pointed out that the debate lacked a clear definition of hegemony.\(^{21}\) Thus, different connotations and meanings proliferated in different academic schools (which would not have been that much of a problem if each proponent would have made explicit which one (s)he preferred when using the term). It was exactly this conceptual arbitrariness that persuaded some political scientists to take what was a qualitative change in American hegemony for its (premature) ending. So-called “revisionists”\(^{22}\) rightly claimed that the so dubbed “declinists” misinterpreted the actual development, because they analysed exclusively the international system (in fact: some narrow factors of it), separating it from necessary relations to subsystemic elements within “national” societies or regional groups of states.

(3) The subsystemic blindness of systemic grand theories

Where preferences of states and their foreign policies are directly derived from the structure of the international system societal conditions are simply dismissed. The diagnosis of hegemonic decline, provoked by the one-sided approach of THS scholars,

---

\(^{19}\) Back then, this conclusion was only made by outsiders and critics of the mainstream debate at the time; see e.g. Russett 1985; Strange 1988. For empirical findings to support strong disagreement with the then popular notion of “hegemonic decline” in the economic realm as well, see Maddison 1991.

\(^{20}\) For the economic basis of the “great reversal” of the 1990s, when the relative economic power of the USA was suddenly assessed completely different (again), cf. Samuelson 1997/1998.


\(^{22}\) Cf. Nye 1990. In sharp contrast to the concomitant silence or complete turnaround of most of the “declinists”, former “revisionist” Joseph Nye did not have to neglect his former arguments (cf. Nye 2002).
entailed the “failure of the THS”.\footnote{Robel 2001.} In the end, the debate about the empirical refutation of the decline thesis, replaced any systematic discussion about the theoretical conception of hegemony. As Stefan Robel has argued elsewhere, this neglect is only a symptom of a general shortcoming of the systemic approach of most THS protagonists: As they do not endogenise subsystemic explanatory variables, the concept of hegemony must remain hollow and vague.\footnote{Cf. ibid. and Robel 1999.}

On this basis we will devise a model of international hegemony that provides analytical space for the development perspective by being sensitive to structures within the societies concerned. In order to provide for the different impact of U.S.-American hegemony on subregions of Latin America, we will first present the fundamental characteristics of this region and the current state of development.

3. The Case of Latin America: Characteristics of a Region\footnote{For an overview of U.S. policy towards Latin America in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, see Lowenthal 1991; for the U.S. policy towards Latin America in the 1990s, see Lowenthal 1990. See also Scholtz 1998; Holden/Zolov 2000; Becker/Bartholo 1999; Boeckh 1996; Brock 1998; Brock 1992b; Carlsen/Barry 2006; Falcoff 2003; Nolte/Oettler 2003; Puhle 1990; Rangel 1987; Smith 1996. For the supposed “Decline of U.S. hegemony” in Latin America and the world, see Bitar 1986. See for an analysis of actors in U.S. policy towards Latin America Wilson 1999.}

(S)he who searches for regional specifics in Latin America will quickly encounter numerous difficulties, because “there is no single Latin America.”\footnote{Cf. Krakau 1992; see also Krakau 2002.} Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some features that are shared by all 33 independent states of the region: Each has inherited a colonial past, most won their independence in the nineteenth century, and, in all states, state-building preceded nation-building.\footnote{Cf. Puhle 1994, 27.} In addition, the continent is characterised by artificial borders, strong personalisation of politics (\textit{Caudillismo}), social inequality, and relatively peaceful relations between neighbouring states. However, within Latin American states a comparatively high level of violence and instability exists.\footnote{Throughout history, Latin America contrasts with Europe in this respect: While Europe suffered from a relatively high amount of interstate conflict, at least until 1945, Latin America enjoyed}
instability have presumably affected development in the region, it makes sense to analyze the ways in which U.S. hegemony has affected these two factors. There is a strong asymmetry in the relationships both between the United States and any single Latin American state and between the United States and Latin America as a whole. For example, the economic power of the U.S. is five times larger than that of all of Latin America. The military sector in particular represents an even stronger asymmetry.30

The question now is whether the U.S.-Latin-American relationship can accurately be described as hegemonic. If we take the notion of hegemony as used in THS, important criteria are certainly met: The absence of interstate wars between Latin American countries themselves, the asymmetry in power, and the U.S. interventions could all adequately be explained with classical THS. Nonetheless, there is room for doubt: For, while Western Europe and Japan strongly profited from U.S. hegemony after World War II and on the whole prospered at an amazing pace in the second half of the 20th century, this has quite obviously not been the case for Latin America. Why has the regional stability, guaranteed by the hegemonic power, not led to a developmental leap forward as it did in Europe? Why have Latin American states not been able to take advantage of the hegemonic peace dividend?

---


30 In spite of the mentioned similarities, specialists on Latin America, as well as US-American politicians usually divide Latin America into four regions: Mexico, Central America, Caribbean und South America (cf. Junker/Nohlen/Sangmeister 1994; Black 1984). South America, as the biggest and most heterogeneous region, is often subdivided into the region of the Andes (Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia), the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay) and Brazil (cf. ibid.). For a geographical derivation of the sub-regions see Gonzalez 1984. The United States has had and still has different hegemonic interests in these regions, therefore a differentiation of Latin American regions is of utmost importance to do justice to this fact.

31 For a selection of major U.S. interventions in Latin America, see Table 1 (Appendices); also see Petras 2002.

While the development aspect of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability clearly holds some truth for Western Europe, it is not at all convincing with respect to Latin America. Indeed, looking at the sub-regional level, it is those Latin American sub-regions with the lowest level of development, namely Central America and the Caribbean Basin, that most directly fall under the hegemonic influence of their powerful northern neighbour. By contrast, the South American subcontinent has a higher GNI per capita than both sub-regions mentioned above. It follows that it is impossible to design a mono-causal model with U.S. hegemony as the independent variable and Latin American (or sub-regional) levels of development as the dependent one. Hegemony matters, but only as an intervening variable. The classical model of THS has to be adapted to Latin America if it is to be used as an explanatory model for development studies.

4. Towards a Society-oriented Model of International Hegemony

As we have outlined earlier, the main structural deficits of the THS were the lack of theoretical conceptualisation of hegemony and the holistic state-centric approach of systemic analyses. We now argue that it is exactly these two defects that prevent(ed) an analysis of underdevelopment within THS given its main premise that a hegemonic state provides/structures order. While the argument concerning the first deficit is quite obvious, the last deficit, state-centrism, deserves more attention: THS scholars either conceive states as unitary, utilitarian actors (Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberal Institutionalism) or omit all subjective capacities of states (World-Systems-Analysis). These approaches therefore cannot deal with the issue of (under-)development.

---

33 Relative to other developing regions, Latin America at first sight shows a positive record of development: In spite of the setback caused by the Argentinean crisis, Latin America has the highest per-capita income, the highest life expectancy and the smallest defence budget of all regions of development (1.3 % of the GDP) (Cf. ibid). However, Latin American countries differ highly in stages of development: In Haiti one person earns 480 U.S. $ on the average and the World Bank classifies it as an LIC (Low Income Country), coming in on 146th place of the UN Human Development Index (HDI). On the Bahamas, on the contrary, the GNI per person amounts to almost 15,000 U.S. $ a year and Argentina ranked 34th on the HDI before the crisis. In this respect, Latin America differs from the “inner circle” of the OECD world, where interstate heterogeneity goes along with comparatively high inner state homogeneity.
adequately, as the state and its internal differentiation are structural conditions for the
development of national economies and societies.

To make U.S. hegemony an analytical factor applicable to the developing world, we
will therefore try to remedy the mentioned defects, starting with the first one, the
lacking theoretical grasp of hegemony.

4.1 Definition and Different Spheres of Influence of Hegemony

Broadening the concept of Heinrich Triepel,\textsuperscript{34} we define international hegemony as
“a specific form of leadership in which the existence and continuity of the relation
depends on the one hand on the power resources of the hegemon, its will and strategic
competence and, on the other hand, on the basically voluntary allegiance of a group of
states which are homogeneous in terms of government (the present special case is the
hegemony of the USA within the ‘OECD world’).”\textsuperscript{35} The establishment and
Persistence of such a hegemonic leadership is conditioned by the “self-restraint of
power”\textsuperscript{36} as well as strategic competence of the hegemon and the perception of
legitimacy of the leadership among the followers. The leadership can only endure, if a
stable long lasting consensus is reached in and between the political systems of all
states concerned. This requires from the hegemonic state that political and societal
stability persist within its borders while at the same time it maintains its capacity of
adaptation to changes in the international system.\textsuperscript{37} On the international level
international institutions play a decisive role in creating and maintaining the
consensus. This conceptualisation of hegemony necessitates a broadening of the
classical understanding of hegemony in two respects: Transnational aspects have to be
included\textsuperscript{38} and hegemony has to be differentiated in terms of its reach and quality.

\textsuperscript{34} Triepel 1974. For a detailed overview on Triepel’s theory of hegemony see Robel 1994, 3-23.
\textsuperscript{35} This definition is to be found in Robel 2001, 21.
\textsuperscript{36} Triepel 1974, 34.
\textsuperscript{37} Robel 2001, 22.
\textsuperscript{38} This will be considered further in chapter 4.2.
Thus the above mentioned definition is only generally applicable to the relation of
the hegemon to a core group of states, usually referred to as the “OECD world”.39
Although the THS implicitly supposed a global hegemony of the United States, its
analytical grasp – as well as its implicit normative component – were always related to
the developed industrial nations, the so called “First world” exclusively. The question
not raised was what the blessings of the “benevolent” hegemon meant for the rest of
the world (the Second and the Third).40

In order to illustrate the sub-global differentiation of spheres of influence of U.S.
hegemony, we want to employ a simple heuristic device (Figure 1): The hegemonic
state is located in the centre of the model. Its decisions determine, to a certain (but
never irrelevant) extent, the existence and chances of success/room for manoeuvre of
all other states in the system. At the same time all states, especially those in the inner
circle of hegemony, condition to some extent which foreign policy decisions can be
taken within the political system and society of the hegemonic state.41

What we have called the “inner circle of hegemony” comprises the rather
homogeneous group of “OECD democracies”. In the context of development these
countries are ordinarily called “developed industrial nations”. Looked at from the
angle of hegemony, the states in this group have in common that hegemonic leadership
is in principle accepted by the overwhelming majority of the country’s elites in and
outside of the government, as well as by the “partially official” representatives of the
population on the whole (the media and the general public). Here, “self restraint of
power”, which Triepel identified as a necessary condition of hegemony,42 is
comparatively high; not only do military interventions by the hegemon not occur, they
seem to be unthinkable.

---

39 Czempiel’s notion of the “Gesellschaftswelt” (“societal world”) describes this section of the
international system quite accurately. For the substantiation of this concept, see Czempiel 1993,
105-132. The notion of societal world should be understood as an analytical metaphor for the
situation of the developed countries in the “North” (the OECD). In these countries democratical
structures ensure a degree of participation of the societies which is unknown to autocratic systems
40 For European literature hinting at this question, see Poitras 1990. A more moderate picture,
particularly of the relations between USA and Columbia, is drawn by Randall 1992.
41 It should be obvious that bilateral relations between the hegemon and other nations are influenced
just as decisively by bi- or multilateral relations among the other nations. In this model, which is
very simplified in order to suit our purpose, these aspects (as e.g. supranational policy making at
the level of the European Union) are not depicted and therefore neglected.
42 The notion of “Selbstbändigung der Macht” (self restraint of power) is a crucial component in
Triepel’s concept of hegemony (cf. Triepel 1974, 41f.); see also Robel 1994, 15f.
The sphere of influence of the *outer circle of hegemony* comprises an extremely heterogeneous group of states, reaching from the classical developing (or underdeveloped) countries and the states succeeding the former “Second World” (the “Eastern Bloc”) to regional superpowers such as India, the People’s Republic of China and Brazil. In most of the states of the “outer circle of hegemony” significant parts of the elite on whose support the government depends secretly if not overtly accept U.S. hegemonic dominance, while the public or significant parts of it (including the local media) are overtly anti-American and oppose collaboration.\(^{43}\)

The *outcasts* oppose the hegemonic U.S. claim to leadership, be it out of choice or by definition of the hegemon (“axis of evil”, “rogue states”\(^{44}\)), temporarily or

---

\(^{43}\) Apart from this, there are cases of transformation and even special cases. In this model, for the sake of simplicity, these cases are usually comprised in the “outer circle”, even though these states have a special status within their region and/or in their relations with the hegemon: The group of oil exporting countries (the members of OPEC); Israel is of course an additional special case in the Middle Eastern region; accepted regional grand powers as the PR of China, India, Russia, South Africa; some transformation states like Poland and the Czech Republic, which have already acceded to EU and NATO and can thus be seen on their way into (or being already within) the inner circle.

\(^{44}\) Ideology and aspects of “Realpolitik” mix, as the hegemon (at least temporarily) possesses semantic authority. In other words, the intransigent behaviour of the USA creates and strengthens “facts”. For a good example, the background of the “rogue state” rhetoric from Clinton to Bush,
permanently. Currently, these states are Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Syria. Certainly Iraq belonged to this group of outcasts before the occupation by American and British troops in 2003. It is less heterogeneous than the bigger group of the outer circle. With regard to the sphere of government, the states share a formal or merely symbolic democratic model of government while they enjoy highly different but, compared to the inner circle, less than average levels of development.

The following should be obvious: The outlined differentiations only make sense, if we analyse not merely on the level of the system of states but also dwell on the relationship of the political system and society. Drawing from the approaches of newer Liberal theories and Neo-Gramscian Political Economy we will continue to deepen our analytical grasp of international hegemony in the following paragraph.

4.2. Core Components of a Society-oriented Analysis of International Hegemony

There are theories of international relations which include societies in their ontology in two respects: Participation or non-participation in political decision-making processes (the active or participatory component) and the extent to which societies are affected by decisions of the political system or the international environment (the passive or component of affectedness). An analysis which is sensitive to societal structures must be able to grasp a situation where at least relevant parts of a society are most negatively affected by the decisions made, precisely because they cannot participate in the decision-making process. Two theories seem to be especially well suited to meet these requirements: The Liberal theoretical

see Rüb 2003. That “membership” of this group can range from either long-lasting to quite short-lived, is rather obvious in view of this nature of their association.

Here we are referring to the adaption of Easton’s model of politics to the international realm as it has been presented by Ernst-Otto Czempiel. In this model, politics is conceived as the result of a process of transformation of demands from the societal and international environments by the political system, cf. Czempiel 1998. A subsystemic analysis often only addresses the participatory component. We strongly reject this attitude.

This approach is not to be confused with a theory centrally concerned exclusively with societies. Our approach does subscribe to the concept of international relations being primarily relations among states. We rather consider, in addition to the system of states, the societal conditions and effects of state politics. Furthermore transnational politics are analysed, which are based within states and which influence their development, particularly through the reaction to state (non-)action.
tradition in IR and the Neo-Gramscian analysis of the International Political Economy. Drawing from Liberal theories Andrew Moravscik outlines the three core components of an ontological alternative to the systemic theories of Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism:

(1) the analytical precedence of societal actors;

(2) the connection between representation and national preferences;

(3) the connection between interdependence, the structure of the system and state behaviour.\textsuperscript{47}

A contemporary conceptualisation of international hegemony must supply a *transnational* perspective to the traditional *international* perspective common in IR theory.\textsuperscript{48} Studying U.S.-American hegemony, Neo-Gramscian approaches seem to complement Liberal theories of international relations in an astonishingly compatible manner: \textsuperscript{49} They analyse the effect of hegemonic ideas to account for aspects of hegemonic power hitherto neglected (e.g. Neo-Institutionalism tends to underestimate the relevance of power). Not only in transnational relations, but also and especially so in international organisations – the traditional subject matter of THS-inspired analyses – fights over discursive supremacy occur. Despite its neo-Marxist background, Cox’ Neo-Gramscianism rejects economic determinism and is thus contradicting classical THS: International organisations are seen primarily as *instruments* of hegemonic world politics,\textsuperscript{50} rather than the neutral providers of pre-existent “public goods” (as conceived in the THS). This supposition radically revises the argument of hegemonic stability: It is not so much that international institutions *need* a hegemon but the

\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Moravcsik 1997.
\textsuperscript{48} An early piece to conceptually address this omission is Strange 1989.
\textsuperscript{49} “World Hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; … it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries” (Cox 1993).
\textsuperscript{50} In this sense they have an ideological function. Cox uses the stance of the OECD for monetarism as an example, which created a dominant consensus on economic policies between “central states”. This consensus, he claims, has strengthened the position of those who champion the fight against inflation rather than the fight against unemployment (cf. Cox 1993, 62ff.).
hegemon uses international institutions to legitimise and preserve the status quo by including national and transnational elites in a consensus over ideas.\textsuperscript{51}

This argument can be useful for understanding why state preferences change or remain unchanged – a question, Liberal theories are mainly concerned with. Neo-Gramscian scholars ask: How do ideas, ideologies and hegemonic projects emerge and assert themselves within one society and how do they come to set the tone in international politics? This ambitious approach thus overcomes the three shortcomings of systemic theories, namely the narrow economic definition, explanatory vagueness and lacking subsystemic differentiation of hegemony. With its twofold orientation towards societal aspects of hegemony (participatory component and degree of affectedness) we can on the one hand analyze the origins and fundamentals of hegemony within the hegemonic state/society and search for its ideological means; on the other hand, societal groups come into focus as the addressees of the advantages as well as the costs of hegemony.

5. Application of the New Hegemonic Model to the Case of Latin America

In any application of such a modified concept of hegemony in political and economic relations between the U.S. and Latin America, analysis must be based on both the will of the hegemonic state to exercise hegemonic power and the acceptance of its hegemony by those states on which the hegemon projects its power and/or exerts “leadership”. In the case of Latin America, U.S.-hegemonic power primarily rests upon acceptance by political, economic and military elites and much less upon acceptance by large shares of the populations. Given the widespread anti-Americanism in many Latin American societies, regardless of their Arielistic or Bolivarian origin,\textsuperscript{52} the region clearly falls into the category of “outer circle”. But how exactly does U.S. hegemony influence stability, peace, and development in the region it neighbours?

The “motives and justifications of U.S. policy towards Latin America … are of astonishing continuity”.\textsuperscript{53} This is because they are based on three relatively stable

\textsuperscript{51} This might be called the Hegemonic Stability reversed argument (cf. Robel 2005).
\textsuperscript{52} See for these concepts page 20.
\textsuperscript{53} Cf. Junker 1994, 53.
topoi, namely the strategic, economic, and ethical interests of the United States in Latin America. 54 Basically, Latin America was of relatively little strategic interest to the U.S. in the first half of the 20th century. It was only when Vice President Nixon’s “Good Will Tour” in the 1950s caused dramatic anti-US reactions throughout the region and when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959 that Latin America really moved to the center of U.S. foreign policy. During the whole Cold War, strategic and security interests dominated U.S. policy towards the South. 55 With the end of the Cold War, the strategic aspects lost relative importance for the benefit of other aspects (debt, drugs, immigration etc.). Especially economic interests rose in rank. After 9/11, security interests again moved to the center of U.S. foreign policy, but because the Global War on Terrorism has not been fought in Latin America, the region again lost importance. 56

During the climax of the Cold War, U.S. strategic interest in Latin America was to prevent Soviet influence on the continent (the “No-Second-Cuba-Policy”). This containment policy was clearly stronger in Mexico, the Caribbean Basin, and Central America than it was in South America.

U.S. economic interests in Latin America have always included access to raw materials (oil, bauxite, copper) and agrarian products, access to Latin American markets for U.S. products, and the safeguarding of trade routes (especially the Panama Canal). Due to the above mentioned asymmetric economic structure, Latin American economic interests in the U.S. are much stronger than U.S. economic interests in Latin America. 57

At least rhetorically (but not exclusively so), all U.S. Presidents emphasised that their major interest concerning the South was not strategic or economic but moral – namely, the democratisation of the continent. 58 However, there was little active or enduring support for democratisation. On the contrary, from 1964 on, the so-called

54 According to Junker these main three interests of the USA coincide with central themes of US-American policy, such as the “Manifest Destiny”, “the Chosen People”, isolationism and interventionism (cf. Junker 1995, 53).
56 Poitras investigates why hegemonic intervention did not occur as frequently in the 1990s (Poitras 1990, 31; Poitras 2002). His main thesis that the will of the hegemon to intervene has diminished since 9/11 (“the Loss-of-Will-Thesis”) has proved true until now.
57 For a comprehensive overview of U.S.-Latin American Trade Policy today, see Feinberg 2002.
“Mann-Doctrine” said that the United States would no longer push for democratic transitions in the hemisphere.

Which instruments does the hegemon use to pursue its interests? Knud Krakau distinguishes two dimensions of exercise of hegemony in Latin America: The unilateral approach, which was formulated in the Monroe-Doctrine, and the multilateral, cooperative strategy, which was institutionalised through the Inter-American System and the Organization of American States (*Pan-Americanism*).\(^{59}\) *Pan-Americanism* stands for the idea of intergovernmental cooperation throughout America, lead by the hegemonic United States. This concept is implicit in the project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).\(^{60}\) De facto *Pan-Americanism* often goes along with attempts to obstruct genuine *Latin American* multilateralism.

Within the context of the unilateral exercise of hegemonic power, the U.S. uses a range of instruments to achieve its objectives, starting with political and diplomatic pressure, followed by economic sanctions and the non-recognition of governments, and finally covert action\(^{61}\) and/or military invasion.\(^{62}\) According to Larman Wilson, U.S. policy towards Latin America is characterised by ambivalence and intolerance about diplomacy\(^{63}\), and indeed, covert action and military invasion are typically used in the outer circle of the hegemonic system or in relation to outcasts. Here the threshold to use force is much lower than in the hegemonic inner circle (where it occurs very rarely). In contrast to inner-circle-regions like Western Europe, hegemonic

---


\(^{60}\) *Pan-Americanism* goes back to the first Inter-American Conference that was held in 1889 in Washington. It is the basis for the “Inter-American System”, which was inaugurated in 1948 with the foundation of the intergovernmental Organisation of American States (OAS). This institution has a secretariat in Washington D.C. See for FTAA and the role of the U.S. in promoting FTAA e.g. Calcagnotto/Nolte 2002; Gratus 2003b.

\(^{61}\) Drawing from a paper known as “NSC 68” published by the U.S. National Security Council on 14 April 1950, we can state that most Covert Actions ranged from financial aid for conservative parties, support of mass media that took a pro-American stance, promotion of conservative elements within the labour unions, espionage against socialist parties to the toleration and direction of attacks on prominent left politicians.

\(^{62}\) This unilateral “Realpolitik” is highly controversial within the USA: The stances of Wilson (self restraint), Franklin D. Roosevelt (Good-Neighbour-Policy) and Kennedy (Alliance for Progress) exemplify multilateral convictions.

influence in outer-circle-regions sometimes resembles traditional imperialistic settings.\textsuperscript{64}

The majority of U.S. interventions in Latin America took place in the Caribbean Basin, Central America, and Mexico, rather than South America.\textsuperscript{65} US-Undersecretary of State Robert Olds justified this empirical fact with an ideological argument when he said in 1927, “we do control the destinies of Central America and we do so for the simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course… Until now, Central America has always understood that governments which we recognize and support stay in power while those we do not recognize and support fall.”\textsuperscript{66} It is especially interesting to notice that military invasions – the most explicit hegemonic instrument – have never occurred in South America, where diplomatic and economic pressure, as well as covert action, dominated. In most cases, there was logistical, financial, and military support for legally or illegally operating groups that were considered to act in favor of U.S. interests or who were assumed to act to the detriment of regimes with a real or supposed ideological proximity to the Soviet Union (e.g. Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973). The U.S. pushed forward its hegemonic interests in a particularly active way in Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, Grenada, Honduras, and El Salvador. Apart from Panama, these countries are particularly poor in comparison with other Latin American states. Beyond the tight frame of the Cold War, the United States intervened in South America only in the context of its “War on Drugs”, mainly in Columbia and Bolivia.\textsuperscript{67}

6. Consequences of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America

(1) Reactions within Latin-American societies and Latin-American Regionalism

There is a substantial and long tradition of criticizing U.S. policies towards Latin America within Latin America itself. U.S. interventionism has always been met with

\textsuperscript{64} For this perspective see in particular Chomsky 1999.
\textsuperscript{65} Cf. Krämer/Kuhn 2005; for the role of the military in different Central and Southern American countries, see the special focus of WeltTrends 49; see also Table 1 (Appendices).
\textsuperscript{66} Olds 1927, 2; also cf. Leogrande 1998. In the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador the peace initiative of the Contadora Group is especially important.
\textsuperscript{67} Cf. Lessmann 2000. See also Galen 2003.
strong reactions. Indeed, “intervention is considered a worse evil than communism, especially since intervention is never applied to foster a democratic cause.” The widespread anti-Americanism is often combined with rejection and criticism of the proposed free-trade area (FTAA) and IMF policies, which are perceived as instruments of U.S. hegemony. Anti-Americanism in Latin America manifests itself in many different forms and is especially strong in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and the “Cono Sur”. The most recent example is Bolivia, where Evo Morales was recently elected President on a distinctly anti-U.S./anti-FTAA platform. The common intellectual basis for these parties and political and social movements is the association with a specific Latin-American identity, one which is sometimes defined by the dissociation from a North American or even all-American identity (“Arielism”). Arielism – in contrast to Bolivarianism – does not strive for a federal union in Latin America but rather aims at cultural and social networking within the region and independence of Latin American culture from U.S. influences.

(2) Inter-state stability

The validity of the hypothesis that the hegemonic position of the U.S. lowers the risk of inter-state war in Latin America is quite obvious, and there are many arguments supporting it. First, there is the classic argument of THS: Latin American states do not go to war with neighbouring states because they anticipate sanctions from the hegemonic power (anticipatory obedience). Secondly, the Monroe-Doctrine ruled out rivalries between European colonial powers in Latin America in the nineteenth century.

---

69 See Sangmeister 2003, 30-37.
70 The concept of “Arielism” dates back to an essay by the Argentinean author Rodó, who stated in 1900 that there was an insurmountable difference between North American “utilitarianism” and Latin American “spiritual” culture (Rodó 1994 [1900]).
71 Bolivarianism is – and has long been – the Latin American federal vision.
72 The situation in South Asia is not fundamentally different, even though at a different level of development: The “new regionalism” (APEC, AFTA) which was at the focus of attention when the Cold War ended, did not materialise as expected: Inter-state institutions in which the USA participates dominate the scene, while integration did not reach a substantial and qualitatively different degree. Institutions from which the USA is absent remain on the level of “historic visions” or fall into oblivion. How difficult it is, even in the inner circle, to achieve substantial multilateral cooperation independent of U.S. dominance shows the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union. The decisive connection between multilateral rhetoric and bilateral practice has not yet been theoretically analysed; cf. Robel 1999.
century.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, there have been extremely few interstate conflicts in Latin America – it “possesses the priceless good of peace because there are no wars between states”\textsuperscript{74} This \emph{noiselessness} of international relations allows Latin American states to have comparably low defense budgets and thereby has positive effects on development. At the same time, the relative peacefulness makes intergovernmental cooperation easier, and intergovernmental cooperation in different policy areas facilitates economic development. All in all, Poitras’ statement from 1990 that “the absence of interstate conflict in the region, due in part to U.S. hegemony, [has] made Latin America relatively peaceful” still holds true.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{(3) Intra-state instability}

The inter-state peacefulness of Latin America stands opposite the relatively unstable situation within many countries in the region. Almost every country in Latin America has experienced both authoritarian and democratic regimes within the last 60 years, and in many countries there have been guerrilla movements, which control large shares of the territory.\textsuperscript{76} William Robinson counts almost 20 violent uprisings in selected Latin American Countries between 1980 and 1994.\textsuperscript{77}

Of course, it would be wrong to explain this situation mono-causally, taking U.S. hegemony for the culprit. There are many reasons for the status quo of development. However, it would be surprising if U.S. hegemony had no influence at all on development in Latin America, especially since it is persistently claimed that the U.S. has “systematically provoked instability and disorder” in Latin America.\textsuperscript{78} The hypothesis that U.S. hegemony leads to an intensification of intra-state instability in Latin America is supported by the following argument: U.S. American hegemony in Latin America, as an outer-circle region, is upheld by elites and not by broad social consensus. In such a situation, Latin American elites serve hegemonic interests, which coincide with their own, but contradict general public opinion. Friction seems to be

\textsuperscript{73} However the Monroe-Doctrine did not contain any explicit guarantee by the U.S.
\textsuperscript{74} Hurtado 1999, 36. From 1942 to 1981, there has not been any military conflict between two Latin American states, cf. Poitras 1990, 21.
\textsuperscript{75} Poitras 1990, 21.
\textsuperscript{76} The most dramatic examples are certainly Columbia, Bolivia, Peru and to a lesser extend Mexico.
\textsuperscript{77} Robinson 1996a and 1996b.
\textsuperscript{78} Krakau 2002, 108.
inevitable. With democratisation forging ahead, pressure grows on Latin American political elites to bear in mind and, at least symbolically, respect Arielistic tendencies and demands. Moreover, direct or indirect U.S. American interventions (often in the context of the fight for ideological dominance in the region) in Latin America occurred regularly during the Cold War. Often, these interventions caused prolonged resistance and enduring civil wars – Central America during the 1980s –, thereby destabilizing not only the countries directly involved but also the region as a whole. As Poitras pointed out at the end of the decade of the 1980s: “Latin America is confronted by the problem of how to counteract hegemonic intervention.” After 1989 most U.S. interventions were indirect, mainly in the context of the so-called War on Drugs in Bolivia and Columbia. The explicit cooperation of a large number of Latin American elites with the U.S., which was more often than not detrimental to the interests of the Latin American populations (e.g. strict measures against coca farmers in Eastern Bolivia in the context of the U.S.-lead War on Drugs or the case of Nicaragua) also had destabilizing consequences.

7. Conclusion: U.S. Hegemony and Development in Latin America: Ambivalence and Ambiguousness

Apart from direct influences of the U.S. on development in Latin America by means of aid programs, there are two major ways how U.S. hegemony affects development in the southern part of the hemisphere.

On the one hand, U.S. hegemony probably supports peaceful interstate relations. In general, peace and international stability facilitate development. On the other hand, according to Black, “the United States, as a result of its efforts to maintain the status quo in Latin America as part of its general policy of preserving the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, [is] a major obstacle to economic, social,

---

79 For the level of democratisation in different Latin American countries, see Table 2 (Appendices).
80 Poitras 1990, 170.
81 Cf. Lessmann 2000; Lessmann 1996.
82 See especially Robinson 1996a and 1996b.
83 For a graphic overview of our main argument, see Figure 2 (Appendices).
Intrastate instability, which is a common phenomenon in Latin America, is partly supported by U.S. hegemony and – due to the often disastrous consequences – constitutes a major obstacle for development. Indeed, the only two countries in the Western Hemisphere which are classified as Low Income Countries (LIC; World Bank) – Haiti and Nicaragua – both look back on a history of frequent and violent interventions.

All in all, U.S. hegemony has had (and continues to have) ambivalent effects on development in Latin America as a region. The overall net effects clearly seem to make development in Latin America under U.S. hegemonic influence structurally much less likely than development in Europe after World War II, where U.S. American hegemony was one of the most important formative external conditions for the catching-up process of West European economies and the concomitant development of their democratic societies. These findings suggest a revision of traditional models of hegemonic stability and the application of the revised and differentiated model of global hegemony. If we chose to apply the society-oriented model suggested here, U.S. hegemony has had and continues to have quite different implications in the inner and the outer circle of hegemonic influence, as IR’s traditional argument of hegemonic stability might suggest. In both its preconditions and its consequences U.S. hegemony depends on and affects actors and structures of society and the state, not just the latter.

---

84 Slater/Black 1984, 238.
87 In this sphere the net effect is clearly more differentiated, despite of some similarities in constitutional aspects of the hegemonic leadership.
Bibliography

Altenburg, Tilman, and Christian von Haldenwang, 2002: Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf breiter gesellschaftlicher Basis – eine Reformagenda für Lateinamerika, Working Paper, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn [http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/2afbf571e27d95f3c1256e6e0059095e/$FILE/Reformagenda%20f%C3%BCr%20Lateinamerika.pdf; reference date: 17 March 2006].


Olds, Robert, 1927: Confidential Memorandum on the Nicaragua Situation, Archives, Record Group 59, Document 817.00/4456.


Rodó, José Enrique, 1994 [1900]: Ariel, Mainz: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.


### Table 1: Important U.S. interventions in Latin America (1913-1991) (Selection)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of hegemonic intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Support for rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Covert Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Covert Action (coup d’etat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Covert Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-80</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Covert Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Covert Action (coup d’etat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Covert Action (coup d’etat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Covert Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Covert Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>“War on Drugs”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Covert Action (coup d’etat)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Democracy and Development Indices
(selected Latin American countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>BTI (status-index; ranking of 119 countries)</th>
<th>BTI (management-index; ranking of 119 countries)</th>
<th>GNI (PPP) in thousand U.S. $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>39,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>5,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). The Status Index’s overall result represents the mean value of the scores for the dimensions “Political Transformation” and “Economic Transformation”. The mean value was calculated using the exact, not rounded values for both these dimensions, which, in turn, were derived from the ratings for the five political criteria (based on 18 indicators) and the seven economic criteria (based on 14 indicators). The table shows rounded scores for political and economic transformation as well as for the Status Index’s overall result. In some cases, therefore, the overall result differs slightly from the mean value.

89 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI; management index). This index evaluates management by political decision-makers while taking into consideration the level of difficulty. The Management Index’s overall result is calculated by multiplying the intermediate result with a factor derived from the level of difficulty evaluation.

Figure 2: Impact of U.S. Hegemony on Development in Latin America

U.S. Hegemony

Inter-state Stability: +

Intra-state Instability: +

Integration in Latin America: +

Development in Latin America

“+” indicates positive influence, “-” indicates negative influence.

---

91


DAP Nr. 3 Schieder, Siegfried, 2001: "Ethisches Völkerrecht"? Für eine diskursive und pragmatische Philosophie des internationalen Rechts.

DAP Nr. 4 Brand, Alexander, und Dirk Schröter, 2002: Identitätsbildung in der Ostseeregion – Kultur als Fundament wirtschaftlicher Integration. (vergriffen)

DAP Nr. 5 Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie, 2002: Diplomacy and CFSP – Insights from historical institutionalism.

DAP Nr. 6 Niemann, Arne, 2002: Communicative Action, the Article 113 Committee and the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services.


DAP Nr. 9 Schröter, Dirk, 2003: Wirtschaftsregionalismus im Ostseeraum – eine interdisziplinäre Hinführung.


DAP Nr. 11 Niemann, Arne, 2004: From pre-theory to theory? Developing a revised neofunctionalist framework for explaining EU decision-making outcomes.

DAP Nr. 13 Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie, 2005: Globalisierung und die These vom Souveränitätsverlust des Staates – Forschungsstand und Perspektiven.

