20.11.2026
Cross-Layer-Angriffe auf die Anonymität von Bitcoin
Unsere Arbeit Exploiting the Lightning Network for Cross-layer Deanonymisation of Bitcoin Nodes wurde zur Veröffentlichung und Präsentation auf der Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026) angenommen. Darüber hinaus wird das methodische Vorgehen auf dem begleitenden Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER) Workshopvorgestellt und diskutiert.
Abstract: While the network-level security of Bitcoin and the Lightning network (LN) have each received a fair amount of attention, their relation is yet to be taken into consideration. The limited body of cross-layer research focuses on privacy but overlooks the peer-to-peer (P2P) layers and how it can potentially support cross-layer deanonymisation. This work bridges the two lines of research and presents the first cross-layer, network-level study of Bitcoin and the LN. We show how co-location of a Bitcoin and LN node can be exploited by a network adversary, e.g., an autonomous system, to support deanonymisation of the Bitcoin node. We introduce an attack that is capable of linking an IP address to a Bitcoin address and a real-world entity. It uses information gathered from the LN’s P2P network to find a relevant address in the blockchain and the alias announced in the LN to match the node to a real-world entity. Our measurements of the live networks and emulation-based evaluation demonstrate the practicality and merit of the attack. Among others, we find that institutional entities are more likely to be fully deanonymised than individuals. We discuss different countermeasures that can be taken at different levels to reduce the viability of this and similar attacks. We examine the impact of using non-default ports for P2P communication and show that encrypted traffic can still be detected reliably. This suggests that both networks need traffic shaping mechanisms to be resistant to traffic analysis.