Bosanayeh, Deeb

Diploma Thesis:
1856

Topic:
Strategy for the future development and handling of construction waste and rubble in Germany

Editor:
Deeb Bosanayeh

University Professor Responsible:
Univ.-Prof. Dr.-Ing. Peter Jehle

Supervisor:
University Supervisor: Dipl.-Ing. Florian Kopf

Editing Period:
01.07.2021 until 21.10.2021

Abstract:
In this paper, the various contracting options available to private developers are presented and evaluated from the perspective of the developer and his project manager and their impact on the monitoring phase is analysed and brought into focus. These effects do not only concern the owner and his conflicts of interest with regard to costs, quality and time for the planned project, but also the engineering office, which represents the interests of the owner vis-à-vis the other parties involved in the construction and assumes his tasks in the various project phases. The personnel as well as the time required for project management and, in some cases, the efficiency of the supervision itself are influenced by the form of award. In order to measure this effect, a random sample of two projects from practice (multi-family house individual award vs. hotel GU award) were compared with each other with regard to: the effort of the project manager, the time delay and cost deviation and the remuneration of the project manager.
From the two projects analysed in this paper, the following emerges:

• JV contracting more efficient than individual contracting.
• Individual contracting not only entailed more than 70% more effort, but also turned out to be the worse paid option.

However, the decision on the form of award must be made individually based on the specifics and needs of the project (the complexity and time tension), as well as the desired goals and the available budget of the client, since individual award is not always the most economical option and awarding to JVs is not the best efficient choice in every situation. For a project manager, the award variants only become equivalent under one condition - when adjusting the remuneration with regard to the selected form of award according to its degree of effort, because the individual award represents the more costly variant in any case.