Philosophisches Kolloquium des Instituts für Philosophie

28.10.26

Abstract: A classical puzzle about epistemic deontology is that it seems to be true that we ought to believe or disbelieve many things, yet such ‘oughts’ seem to presuppose a form of voluntary control that we (generally) lack. An underappreciated response to this puzzle says that there are true epistemic ‘oughts’ that do not presuppose voluntary control, namely evaluative ‘oughts’, which concern how things ought to be (e.g., one's beliefs ought to be well supported by one's evidence). Yet such evaluative ‘oughts’ have in turn been thought to entail obligations to bring about how things ought to be. My unorthodox claim will be that the epistemic obligations in question concern the beliefs of others. In my talk, I will motivate and develop an account of these interpersonal doxastic obligations by drawing inspiration from legal theory, where structurally analogous obligations are well studied and have been systematically codified. More specifically, I will draw on conceptualizations of duty-to-rescue laws to spell out and defend the claim that we are epistemically obliged to intervene in each other’s believing.

"Epistemic Microaggressions and Epistemic Harm in Medicine"

Abstract: tba

02.12.26

"The Pragmatic Dimension of Scientific Understanding: Understanding-for Climate Extremes"

"Towards a Justice-Oriented Climate Science"

tba