Transportation economics

E-Mobility

We examine whether charging electric vehicles at the workplace will become a widespread phenomenon. We develop a theoretical model where employers offer contracts including the charging option and a compensation for charging. As the simulations show, employees will not accept any contract that provides also net benefits to the employer. These results suggest that one cannot expect a huge supply of charging stations at firms. Our finding provides an explanation for the actual small number of those charging stations. We also find that this will not change without public interventions.

Fetene GM.., Hirte G., Kaplan S., Prato C., and S. Tscharaktschiew (2016): The economies of workplace charging. Transportation Research Part B, 88, 93-118.

This article deals with the question whether electricity subventions for promoting e-mobility are reasonable. We use a regional equilibrium model to calculate the level of electricity taxes. The results show that electricity for e-mobility should be taxed instead of subsidised, independent of varying input parameters.

Hirte, G. and S. Tscharaktschiew (2013): The optimal subsidy on electric vehicles in German metropolitan areas, Energy Economics, 40, pp. 515-528.

Externalitäten

Contrary to most of the other studies, this article looks at the wealth effects of speed limits on traffic flow and accidents. We use a computable general equilibrium model. The results show that a speed limit of 30 km/h does not lead to wealth benefits. But if regional effects and different street categories are considered speed limits increase wealth.

Nitzsche, E. and S. Tscharaktschiew (2013): Efficiency of speed limits in cities: A spatial computable general equilibrium assessment, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 56, pp. 23-48.

Parking and regulation of parking

We use a Discrete Choice experiment to study changes in mode choice as a response to parking cash-out. Parking cash-out is a regulation of parking at the workplace that demands employer to offer a wage supplement instead of a parking place. We find that parking cash-out reduces the mode share of cars when comuting.

Evangelinos C., Tscharaktschiew S., Marcucci E., und V. Gatta (2018). Pricing workplace-parking via cash-out: Effects on model choice and implications for transport policy. Transportation Research A 113, 369-368.

Estimation of Travel time savings

Travel time saveings are often a major effect in cost-benefit analyses of transportation projects. Therefore the evaluation of the value of travel time savings, the exchange ratio between time and money is of great importance. Several research papers at the chair cover this issue:

Obermeyer, A. (2021): Kleine Einzelreisezeitgewinne in Nutzen-Kosten-Analysen von Verkehrsprojekten, Zeitschrift für Verkehrswissenschaft (ZfV), 91(2), 61-80.

Obermeyer, A. Treiber, M. and Evangelinos, C. (2015): On the identification of thresholds in travel choice modelling, The Journal of Choice Modelling 17, S. 1-9.

Obermeyer, A. and Evangelinos, C. (2014): Die Theorie der Zeitallokation und die empirische Reisezeitbewertung, Zeitschrift für Verkehrswissenschaft 85 (1), S. 56-81.

Fuel taxes

We challenge the standard approach of transportation economists to apply only a single approach of labor choice when numerically studying transport policy instruments. We examine a model with fixed labor days (fixed commuting trips) and a model with an endogenous choice of workdays by applying Monte Carlo simulations in an aggregate economic model of transport demand. We find strong differences in the size of efficient instruments. Our recommendation is that researchers should apply both a model of endogenous working hours and a model of endogenous workdays because the first provides the upper limit and the second the lower limit for optimal tax levels and its components.

Hirte, G., Tscharaktschiew, S. (2020). The role of labor-supply margins in shaping optimal transport taxes. Economics of Transportation 22.

Seldom Taxes on gasoline lead to an efficient allocation in the market of motorized individual traffic. This article looks at the effect of e-mobility on this allocation. A gasoline toll which is too low leads, together with governmental incentives to buy e-mobiles, to a decreasing difference between optimal tax and current tax.

Tscharaktschiew, S. (2015): How much should gasoline be taxed when electric vehicles conquer the market? An analysis of the mismatch between efficient and existing gasoline taxes under emerging electric mobility. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 39, pp. 89-113.

However, American cities are heterogeneous there is a low divergence of gasoline taxes. We examine if this low difference emerges because of efficiency reasons. The results show that the tax is generally too low and a greater divergence could lead to a higher corporate wealth.

Hirte, G. and S. Tscharaktschiew (2015): Optimal Fuel Taxes and Heterogeneity of Cities. Review of Regional Research 35, pp. 173-209.

Public transport

By using a numerical regional equilibrium model we look at the effect of subventions of public transport. Very low and no subventions are optimizing wealth. In contrast to that, subventions of urban individual motor car traffic lead to deadweight losses of users.

Tscharaktschiew, S. and G. Hirte (2012): Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 46(2), pp. 285-309.

Reduction of emissions

There are different possibilities to determine fees for the reduction of CO2-emissions. We discuss these fees. CO2-emissions can be reduced by 1 to 11 % when urban traffic is taxed by a Pigouvian tax. If congestion costs are considered, the effect can be even higher.

Tscharaktschiew, S. and G. Hirte (2010): The Drawbacks and Opportunities of Carbon Charges in Metropolitan Areas - A Spatial General Equilibrium Approach, Ecological Economics, 70(2), pp. 339-357.

This article looks at different possibilities of urban emission limits. We use a general speed limit, a Cordon toll for total urban traffic, private traffic and economic traffic as well as a toll on urban motorways for motorized individual traffic and economic traffic. The Cordon toll is most effective for total urban traffic and private traffic, respectively.

Hirte, G. and Nitzsche, E. (2013): Evaluating Policies to Achieve Emission Goals in Urban Road Transport. Zeitschrift für Verkehrswissenschaften, 84(2), pp. 112-137.